Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2011

Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture
Tell Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support
After Divorce
Judith G. McMullen
Marquette University Law School, judith.mcmullen@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About Women,
Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 41 (2011)
Repository Citation
McMullen, Judith G., "Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After
Divorce" (2011). Faculty Publications. Paper 559.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/559

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2012 10:14 AM

Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About
Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce
JUDITH G. MCMULLEN*
ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, fewer divorcing women have received alimony, and when
alimony awards are made, they are in declining amounts and for shorter periods of time.
Conventional explanations of this trend focus on legal changes that have made divorces
easier to obtain, as well as social changes that have led to larger numbers of married
women in the paid workforce, and to greater social tolerance of divorce. Certainly these
changes partly explain the downward trend in alimony, but they do not fully explain
why alimony awards continue to decline, even among women who do not have viable job
skills at the time of divorce and who experience severe post-divorce financial hardship.
This article looks to the women themselves and uses social science research to
examine gender differences in emotional reactions to marriage and divorce. The article
argues that women’s tendency to assume emotional responsibility for the success of the
marriage and parenting, and in particular women’s greater susceptibility to feelings of
guilt and shame about divorce and parenting, make it difficult for many women to
successfully negotiate for alimony. Further, the article looks at women’s feelings and
behaviors in negotiation situations, arguing that social pressures exacerbate the feelings
of guilt over the divorce and lead women to accept unfavorable outcomes. Ultimately,
this article concludes that the legal system may need to impose solutions, such as
mandatory pre-nuptial agreements or alimony formulas, in order to achieve a degree of
predictability and fairness in alimony outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alimony1—a

stream of income paid by one ex-spouse to another—is
frequently discussed in media stories about divorces of the rich and famous.
Camille Grammer, a “Real Housewives of Beverly Hills” star and ex-wife of actor
Kelsey Grammer, may be getting as much as $50 million dollars in her divorce.2
Ms. Grammer, a mother of two who was married to Mr. Grammer for thirteen
years, previously rejected a settlement offer of $30 million because the offer did
not include alimony or child support.3 In another story, it is reported that movie

* Professor of Law, Marquette University; B.A, University of Notre Dame; J.D., Yale Law
School.
1. Support paid by one ex-spouse to the other ex-spouse may be referred to as spousal support,
spousal maintenance, maintenance, or alimony. I use the traditional—and shorter—term “alimony”
throughout this article.
2. Camille Grammer Could Get $50 Million in Divorce, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 1,
2011, at A2.
3. Id.
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star Michael Douglas is being taken to court by his ex-wife, Diandra Davis, who
claims she is entitled to half of his income from Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps.4
Still other juicy tidbits of information surround golfer Tiger Woods who is
allegedly paying $100 million to his ex-wife, Elin, who will also receive custody
of the couple’s two children.5 Steep alimony payments by celebrities have been
reported for decades, and examples of conflicts and resentment over the
payments abound. Tony Curtis’s obituary notes that he blamed his long career
slump in the 1970s on his cocaine and alcohol addictions, which he said were
fueled, at least in part, by rage over alimony payments he had to make to his
many ex-wives.6
Meanwhile, the alimony experience of ordinary citizens is more nuanced.
Awards of alimony are theoretically ordered when one spouse has greater need,
the other spouse has the ability to pay, and payment is deemed to be fair in some
sense.7 The terms “need,” “ability,” and “fair” are highly subjective in this
context. In some states—or at least in some states’ courtrooms—litigants who are
far from rich and famous may be ordered to pay long-term or permanent
alimony, even if their marriages were of short duration, and even if their exspouses are employed. For example, in an article discussing proposed changes
to Massachusetts divorce law, The Boston Globe interviewed several long-time
alimony payers.8 One interviewee, Steve Niro, was married to his first wife in
1981 and divorced after less than five years of marriage.9 Despite the fact that
Niro remarried over fifteen years ago, and that the children from his first
marriage are all adults and out of school, he still must pay alimony to his first
wife, Carol.10 In fact, two years prior to the newspaper interview, the judge
raised his alimony payments from sixty-five dollars per week to seven hundred
dollars per week.11 Niro argued that Carol had plenty of opportunity to retool
herself for the job market after their youngest child (now twenty-five) went off to
college; Carol’s lawyer argued that her child-rearing gave Niro an uninterrupted
chance to develop his career.12 The Globe article cited other payers, including
Rudolph Pierce, who was ordered to pay $110,000 per year in alimony after he
was divorced from his wife of thirty-two years.13 When Pierce retired, a judge
reduced the payment to $42,000 per year despite the fact that his ex-wife was
4. Lynn Crosbie, Michael Douglas Battles Another Cancer–the Ex, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada),
Aug. 30, 2010, available at http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/lynn-crosbie/michael-douglasbattles-another-cancer-the-spiteful-ex/article1690421/?service=mobile.
5. Guy Adams, Out of the Woods: Tiger’s Wife Elin to Bag $100 Million and Custody in Divorce
Settlement, INDEP. (London), July 4, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
out-of-the-woods-tiger-wife-elin-to-bag-100m-and-custody-in-divorce-settlement-2017909.html.
6. Adam Bernstein, Iconic Actor Battled Addiction, then Became a Painter, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2010, at B7.
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Wis. 1987).
8. Bella English, Years and Marriages Later, They Still Pay, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2010,
http://web.archive.org/web/20100720100245/http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/family/articles/2
010/0 7/18/years_and_marriages_later_former_spouses_still_owe_alimony/.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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earning $95,000 per year at the time of his retirement and had over $1 million in
assets.14 Pierce and his ex-wife later came to an agreement in which he no longer
paid alimony.15
In contrast, there are reports demonstrating that many people who appear
to be natural candidates for substantial or permanent support are not awarded
alimony. Consider the case of Terry Hekker, a woman served with divorce
papers on her 40th wedding anniversary.16 Ironically, she was well known for a
New York Times OpEd piece that evolved into a book which claimed that being
a housewife was a noble and desirable profession.17 Hekker describes her
disillusionment in a post-divorce OpEd piece.18 “I was stunned to find myself, at
this stage of life, marooned,” she writes.19 “And it was small comfort that I
wasn’t alone. There were many other confused women of my age and
circumstance who’d been married just as long, sharing my situation.”20 She
describes her financial woes, noting bitterly that while her ex-husband got to
take his new girlfriend to Cancun, she was eligible for food stamps and had to
sell her engagement ring in order to pay for roof repairs.21 She laments: “The
judge had awarded me alimony that was less than I was used to getting for
household expenses, and now I had to use that money to pay bills I’d never seen
before: mortgage, taxes, insurance and car payments. And that princely sum was
awarded for only four years, the judge suggesting that I go for job training when
I turned sixty-seven.”22
The above examples illustrate the subjective, complicated, and
unpredictable nature of alimony decisions.
They also demonstrate the
frustration and unhappiness that can result from ill-defined and inconsistently
applied policies.
This paper examines the current state of alimony in the United States in a
way that explores the subjective standards and unpredictable results in alimony
disputes, and it tries to make sense of current alimony patterns by examining the
psychological states of divorce litigants. The article will begin by discussing the
evolution of alimony and will revisit a fairly traditional analysis that suggests
alimony has gradually diminished as expectations about marriage have changed
and women have gained greater opportunities in the workplace. It then
discusses research published in sociological and psychological literature that
gives greater insight into psychological reasons for alimony’s decline. Here the
article focuses on the emotional facets of divorce, particularly for women, and
will argue that divorcing women experience strong feelings of guilt and shame
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Terry Martin Hekker, Op-Ed., Paradise Lost (Domestic Division), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/fashion/sundaystyles/01LOVE.html?pagewanted=all.
17. Id. See also TERRY MARTIN HEKKER, EVER SINCE ADAM & EVE (1980). Hekker also has a new
book entitled DISREGARD FIRST BOOK, which cautions young women not to follow her risky example.
TERRY MARTIN HEKKER, DISREGARD FIRST BOOK (2009).
18. Hekker, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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which impair their ability to pursue alimony, thus contributing to a low
likelihood of receiving it. This article contends that these feelings of guilt and
shame contribute to gender differences in negotiating behavior that jeopardize
fair settlements for some divorcing women. The article concludes with a brief
description of three possible changes in the law: the abolition of alimony, the
requirement of pre-nuptial agreements, and alimony formulas. Alimony
formulas, already in operation in several jurisdictions, have the most potential
for alleviating some of the unpredictability and unfairness often found in cases
where alimony is an issue.
II. DECLINE IN ALIMONY
This section examines the history of alimony and discusses research
showing that, in recent decades, alimony, while never granted in the majority of
cases, has been awarded even less frequently, in smaller amounts, and for briefer
periods of time. This section also discusses the continuing problems of vague
standards for awards and unpredictable outcomes in cases where alimony is in
dispute. Finally, this section examines social trends in marriage that have likely
affected expectations and behavior of both litigants and other interested parties
(such as judges and lawyers) at the time of a divorce.
A. The Rise and Fall of Alimony Awards
Alimony has its roots in a time when divorce was essentially impossible,
and husbands owned all the property and controlled all the income.23 In extreme
cases involving infidelity or desertion by the husband, a court could grant a
“Divorce from Bed and Board” authorizing the spouses to live apart, but the
husbands remained legally responsible for the financial support of their wives
even if the couple was officially separated.24 The husband’s payment of support
during separation was the original form of alimony.25
Once divorce became possible for ordinary couples, the notion of continuing
spousal support remained, despite its conceptual inconsistency with the idea that
divorce represents a fresh start for ex-spouses.26 Alimony was awarded to the
wife, however, only if she was the “innocent” party in the divorce and her
husband was “guilty” of infidelity, cruelty, or other behavior leading to the
demise of the marriage.27 When determining the amount of the award, courts
looked at fault, the amount of property the wife brought into the marriage, the
wife’s needs, and the husband’s station in life.28 Sometimes husbands lacked the

23. Robert W. Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 186,
187 (1939), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1189356.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 191–92.
26. Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Financial Incidents of Family Dissolution, in CROSS CURRENTS:
FAMILY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 387, 393–392 (Sanford N.
Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean eds., 2000) (describing this evolution in the context of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act).
27. Marsha Garrison, “Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution
Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 626–27 (1991).
28. Id. at 627.
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income to adequately compensate their wives with alimony for property brought
into the marriage, and some courts began using distributions of property to
remedy situations where a husband could not, or would not, pay sufficient
alimony to support an ex-wife.29 This new concept of equitable property
distribution allowed courts to distribute property to needy wives and ignore the
fact that property was almost invariably titled in the husband’s name.30
Despite the fact that courts could use property distribution to fashion
individualized divorce outcomes, wives were often not seen as having a just
claim at divorce to property purchased with the husband’s income, or titled in
the husband’s name, until the 1960s and 1970s.31 In the absence of any property
rights, a divorcing woman’s only possible claim for economic benefits took the
form of alimony.32 Beginning in the late 1960s, reformers worked for the
abolition of fault as a basis for granting divorces, and they urged the use of
property division, rather than alimony, to assure fair economic decisions in the
divorce.33 Reformers claimed that property division could achieve fairer results
in a divorce because one could not count on either the award of alimony or on its
payment.34 Reformers succeeded in removing the requirement of proving fault
in order to receive a divorce or as a basis for awards of property or support, and
they also accomplished the goal of making receipt of marital property the main
economic entitlement of a divorcing wife.35 Alimony became less important both
in theoretical and practical terms, but no state actually abolished it because
“reformers realized that women were not equals in the marketplace, and that
need thus could not be ignored as a factor in divorce decision making.”36
After the divorce reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, both property distribution
and alimony awards were awarded on a flexible basis, taking into consideration
need and spousal behavior.37 Although alimony was not awarded in the
majority of cases, alimony awards became even less common as the justification
for awards became more complicated.38 Law professor Marsha Garrison cited
data showing low rates of alimony throughout the twentieth century, with cases
involving alimony awards amounting to only about 25 percent of all divorce
cases.39 Naturally, an award did not guarantee payment, and many women
29. Id.
30. Id. at 628.
31. See generally, LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 398 (3d
ed. 2005) [Hereinafter HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE] (describing rules of property division at
divorce).
32. Garrison, supra note 27, at 629.
33. Id. at 629.
34. Id. at 629–30. “Surveys consistently showed that no more than a quarter of divorced wives
were awarded alimony and that even fewer actually received payments. Alimony critics—including
many feminists and women’s advocates—also urged that the traditional emphasis on fault and need
in setting alimony awards perpetuated traditional notions of women as dependents and failed to
recognize the value of a wife’s contributions as a homemaker and parent.” Id.
35. Id. at 628–31.
36. Id. at 630.
37. Id. at 630–31.
38. Id. at 628–33.
39. Id. at n.27 (citing PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127–28 (1959))
(reporting that 9.3 percent of U.S. divorces included provisions for permanent alimony between 1887
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never received the amounts ordered.40 Garrison compared divorce outcomes in
1978 cases to outcomes in 1984 cases in three New York counties to assess the
impact of New York’s 1980 equitable distribution law.41 Her study found clear
trends in alimony awards:
In contrast to the relative stability in property distribution before and after the
equitable distribution law, dramatic change in the frequency and duration of
alimony awards occurred after the passage of the new law. Over the research
period, the proportion of cases in which alimony was awarded in the three
research counties declined by fully 43 percent. This decline was statistically
significant and occurred consistently in all case categories and counties. . . An
even more dramatic change occurred in the duration of alimony awards. . . In
1978 approximately four out of five alimony awards were permanent. In 1984
about half that number were; the majority of awards were for a limited duration.
The change was, again, statistically significant and consistent across case
categories and across counties.42

Other studies confirm that the decline in alimony awards is a continuing
phenomenon. For example, in a study of 2005 divorce cases in Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, Debra Oswald and I found that alimony was awarded in
only 8.6 percent of the cases.43 Of these, 58 percent were for a set number of
months (with a mean duration of 60.69 months), and 17 percent were permanent
awards.44 Another 8 percent of the awards were payable until certain conditions
were fulfilled, such as graduating from school, selling the family home, or
obtaining employment.45
Alimony now represents neither a duty of the husband nor an entitlement
of the wife. Courts have the power to order alimony in any circumstances where
one spouse (usually the wife) has need and the other spouse (usually the
husband) has the ability to pay.46 The general rule is that only spouses of “longterm” marriages are eligible for court-ordered alimony, but “long-term” is not
specifically defined.47 Courts do not look only at a marriage’s longevity in

and 1906, that alimony/property settlement awards for 13 states ranged from 10.7 percent (Florida)
to 42.2 percent (Nebraska) around 1939 and from 7.2 percent (Florida) to 48.4 percent (Kansas)
around 1950, and concluding that “alimony or property settlement awards are now made in about
one fourth of the marriages dissolved in the United States”).
40. Id. at 629–30.
41. See generally id.
42. Id. at 697–98.
43. Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of
Divorce Cases 12 J. L. FAM. STUD. 57, 75 (2010). Another 2.6 percent received “family support,” which
is a hybrid of alimony and child support under Wisconsin law. Id. Our study looked at 567 cases, a
random sample from Waukesha County, WI, a county with a significantly above average median
income which meant that in many cases, a lack of alimony was for reasons other than poverty. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 75.
46. See, e.g., In re Marriage of LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 739–40 (Wis. 1987).
47. I have found no authoritative definition of what makes a marriage “long.” Indeed, judges
exercise their discretion to find marriages of varying lengths long enough to justify an alimony
award, an exercise of the “I’ll know it when I see it” variety. The McMullen-Oswald study used
fifteen years, or nearly twice the average marriage length of eight years, to denote a long marriage.
Id. at n.66.
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making alimony determinations. Legislatures have produced long lists of factors
for the court’s consideration, and doctrines have evolved to allow alimony to be
used for purposes other than only keeping divorced women out of dire
poverty.48
Courts and legislatures struggle to justify alimony, even as they award it
less frequently, in lesser amounts, and for shorter periods of time.49 The case law
has evolved in a way that allows spousal maintenance payments to be used for
rehabilitation or restitution.50 In addition, as Susan Moller Okin explains, in
order to obtain alimony, the burden of proof fell on the woman who suddenly
had to prove that she could not support herself.51 Rehabilitation means bringing
the lower earning spouse to the point where she can support herself at the
marital standard of living, while restitution means giving the lower earning
spouse a stream of income that would partly make up for the loss of the marriage
and the expected economic benefit she would have received from her own
investment in the well-being of her husband and children.52 Alimony awards
are, at least in theory, made with a view towards balancing the desire for a fresh
start with the interest in bringing the lower-earning spouse up to the marital
standard of living, or at least equalizing any drops in standard of living between
the parties.53 To the extent that alimony is used for rehabilitation or restitution,
however, it is supposed to be awarded only until the objective is reached, with
permanent alimony becoming more and more exceptional.54
As long as women earn less on average than men, and as long as women
continue to elect to stay home with young children to a greater extent than do
men, it would seem that alimony would have a robust status in divorce cases.
This has not been the case. The few empirical studies conducted on this topic
show that alimony is awarded in only a small minority of cases, and the amounts
and duration of the awards have become increasingly modest.55
This reduction in amounts and duration of alimony awards appears to be
48. For example, a court has discretion to order alimony to fund education for an ex-wife so that
she will be able to support herself at a standard of living more similar to that enjoyed during
marriage rather than merely at a subsistence level. See, e.g., LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d.at 742.
49. Garrison, supra note 27, at 633–36. “[N]o clear consensus has emerged on the merits of equal
property distribution as compared to equitable, or on standards for the determination of alimony
awards.” Id. at 636.
50. “Although courts in most states retain discretion in matters of spousal support, most states
now regard alimony as rehabilitative and short term.” Mark A. Fine & David R. Fine, An Examination
and Evaluation of Recent Changes in Divorce Laws in Five Western Countries: The Critical Role of Values, 56
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 249, 254 (1994) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989) and S.M. Oster, A
Note on the Determinants of Alimony, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 81, 81–86 (Feb. 1987)).
51. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 164 (1989).
52. When a wife gives up work opportunities to concentrate on her home, husband, and
children, her choice is likely a joint decision from which both spouses benefit in personal and
economic ways, and the wife is seen as having built an entitlement to be compensated if the marriage
ends. John Eekelaar, Post-Divorce Financial Obligations, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW IN ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, 405, 420, (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis
Maclean eds., 2000).
53. See, e.g., LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d.at 742.
54. Blumberg, supra note 26, at 392.
55. See Garrison, supra note 27; McMullen & Oswald, supra note 43.
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accompanied by diminishing social sympathy for women who seek post-divorce
spousal support.56 Although there is some evidence of popular support for
utilizing alimony to help women stay home with young children, there is a
remarkable lack of sympathy for divorcing women who have done just that and
now find themselves divorced, jobless, and with an empty nest.57 In a recent
study examining social attitudes towards awarding alimony after a divorce,
Professors Ira Mark Ellman and Sanford Braver presented individuals with a
survey, asking them to indicate whether they would award alimony to couples
described in a series of vignettes and, if they would award it, how much they
would award and for how long.58 This study illustrates the somewhat
complicated relationship between alimony and child-rearing, showing that while
the presence of minor children in a marriage significantly increases the likelihood
that ordinary citizens would grant alimony to a parent who has primary
responsibility for their care, the same citizens were not as sympathetic to a
mother who had formerly been the primary caregiver.59 The data demonstrates
“that our respondents are in general more likely to award alimony as the male
partner’s income goes up, the female partner’s income goes down, the relational
duration is extended, and when children are in the household.”60 Of these
factors, only the disparity in the partners’ incomes has any significant effect on
the amount.61 On the other hand, the survey respondents were less likely to
award alimony if the children were grown (48 percent), rather than still in the
household (58 percent), even if they were told that the mother previously had
primary child-rearing responsibility.62 The respondents “seemed to care less
about compensating the mother for the lingering costs that arose from her history
of care, and more about the custodial household’s current situation.”63
In Ellman and Braver’s study, respondents were sympathetic to stay-athome mothers and, to some extent, receptive to the notion that stay-at-home
mothers might need continued financial support.64 However, respondents were
less sympathetic to the women who are in many ways the most disadvantaged in
the job market: the long-term stay-at-home mothers whose children have grown
and left home.65 This data is consistent with Marsha Garrison’s findings that
many displaced homemakers exiting long-term marriages do not receive alimony
at the time of divorce.66 Moreover, the Ellman and Braver study emphasizes the
lack of broad social support for women who have chosen to forgo significant

56. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Family Obligations: The
Case of Alimony, (July 8, 2011) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Social Science Research
Network).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The authors did not discuss the duration of the awards in this draft.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Garrison, supra note 27.
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paid employment during their marriages.67
In an online discussion about a stay-at-home divorced mother, several
comments offer a clue as to the apparent lack of sympathy for women who seek
post-divorce spousal support: namely the commenters’ own bad experiences.68
Some of these people recount the divorces of their own parents as cautionary
tales.69 One commenter describes her mother as having been in “an awful
situation” after her husband of twenty-seven years divorced her.70 Her mother
had no job skills or recent job experience, having stayed home to raise the
children, but since the children were grown at the time of the divorce, the exhusband had no incentive to continue supporting his ex-wife.71 Another
commenter, whose parents’ twenty-five year marriage ended unexpectedly with
a “traumatic divorce,” opines that young people thinking about having a family
should focus on job skills and “should only have as many children as would be
feasible to support as a working parent.”72
Other commenters cite their own divorce experiences.73 For example, one
mother whose husband left her and their infant child was grateful she had the
foresight to engage in part-time employment after the baby was born since she
was in a position to become self-supporting after her husband’s unexpected
departure and failure to continue child support payments.74 In a country with a
50 percent divorce rate,75 it stands to reason that many individuals judge
petitions for alimony in the light of their own experiences. Many of these
comments seem to demonstrate a belief that alimony is uncertain and that
women should not count on it, especially since women may not be able even to
count on steady, complete child-support payments from their ex-spouses.
The biggest problem with alimony laws and practices may indeed be the
sheer unpredictability of the outcomes in divorce cases where alimony is at issue.
In Professor Garrison’s 1991 article, she examines data from 1978 and 1984,
comparing alimony outcomes in light of factors such as wife’s age, length of
marriage, wife’s contribution to family income, custody, type of legal
representation, and husband’s income.76 Garrison concludes that, while there
were some factors that were predictors of alimony awards, these factors did not
completely explain alimony outcomes:
An older, long-married wife whose income is low in relation to that of her
husband is the best candidate for alimony, but many wives with all of these

67. Ellman & Braver, supra note 56.
68. Lisa Belkin, Divorce and the Stay-at-Home-Mom, N.Y.TIMES MOTHERLODE (Jan. 19, 2011, 12:48
PM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/divorce-and-the-stay-at-home-mom.
69. See, e.g., Mary, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Icabod, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68;
J.T., Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
70. Mary, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
71. Belkin, supra note 68.
72. J.T., Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
73. See, e.g., Opalmom, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; lassie, Comment to Belkin, supra note
68.
74. lassie, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
75. See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(MAR. 7, 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm.
76. Garrison, supra note 27, at 647.
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characteristics still fail to obtain an alimony award. A permanent award is,
again, more likely in a long marriage, but is by no means guaranteed. Moreover,
the likelihood of an award is strongly correlated with the type of divorce action
and the couple’s representation by legal counsel, factors that may bear no
relationship to the appropriateness of an alimony award. Alimony decision
making appears to be partly rational, but to rest as well on factors that are
inexplicable from the information at hand.77

Garrison’s conclusions are based on her study of New York cases, but
inconsistency is by no means limited to New York.78 The McMullen-Oswald
study found that alimony awards were more likely if spouses were older,
marriages were longer, and husbands had higher incomes, and that income
disparity between the two spouses was significantly greater in cases where
alimony was awarded.79 Nonetheless, just as in Garrison’s study, many people
who could have received alimony based on the above factors (and arguably
should have received alimony based on need) did not in fact receive it.80
Moreover, unlike the states in which these studies were conducted, some
states do not even have specific statutory standards setting forth how a court
should determine whether to award alimony.81 Even in states that have specific
factors a court must consider in deciding whether to award alimony, these
factors are not typically ranked in terms of importance, which results in a
confusing and unpredictable system where courts make ad hoc decisions, and
neither lawyers nor divorcing parties can predict what will happen.82 While
some jurisdictions now use formulas for alimony, such formulas are typically
aimed at calculating alimony awards rather than specifying who is eligible to
receive alimony.83 This uncertainty may disadvantage either party, but it likely
is more of a hindrance to women since women are more likely to have a lower
income and spend greater time away from the workforce, especially if there are
children from the marriage.84
Alimony has not traditionally been guided by the kind of coherent theories
that govern other issues in divorce.85 In the case of property division, most states
have moved towards an equal division of property accumulated during the

77. Id. at 711.
78. See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 43, at 76–77.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jennifer L. McCoy, Comment, Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current
Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 501, 502 (2005); David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important
Policy in Need of a Coherent Policy Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 325–26 (2009). For example, Michigan
authorizes grants of alimony as satisfaction of all of the wife’s dower or other claims in the property
of the husband, but does not list factors to be considered in determining when the award of alimony
is proper. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.101 (2011). Another section allows a court to order payments for
the support of custodial parents of minor children, where the parent cannot provide necessities for
herself or her children, and the other parent has the ability to pay. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.451
(2011). The statute lists no criteria that must be considered by the court in making or denying the
award other than need (of the recipient) and ability to pay (of the non-custodial parent).
82. Hardy, supra note 81, at 336.
83. See infra Part IV.C.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. AREEN & REGAN, FAMILY LAW 696 (5th ed. 2006).
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marriage as a presumptive starting point.86 Child support is determined by
formulas, and deviations are allowed in only extremely high or low-income
situations.87 Even custody, with its long history of rhetoric insisting on childcentered case-by-case determinations, is increasingly addressed from a
presumption of significant physical placement time with each parent.88 Alimony,
though, remains purely discretionary with the court, and the lack of coherent
standards guiding the decision makes it completely unpredictable.
B. Social Changes in Marriage and Divorce: The Traditional Explanation for
Alimony’s Decline
This section re-examines a traditional line of analysis which holds that social
trends in divorce and marriage have combined to produce the patterns of decline
and inconsistency that we currently see in alimony awards. This analysis focuses
on two trends: first, that men and women alike have come to seek marriage less
for its possible economic benefits and more for its provision of love and
emotional fulfillment, and second, that the sharing of both earning and parenting
roles by ever-growing numbers of spouses has changed social expectations about
what is fair in the event of a divorce.89 The conclusion is that these developments
have likely contributed to a general reluctance to claim, agree to, or award
alimony.
There have certainly been profound changes over the past century in the
way people view marriage in general and equally profound changes in the way
they view goals and responsibilities within their own marriages. It appears that
marriage has come to be viewed less as an economically beneficial arrangement
and more as an emotionally satisfying relationship.90 In the nineteenth century,
marriage allowed a gender-based division of labor and entitled a man to the
labor of his wife and of his children.91 Marriage was also how nineteenth century
women achieved economic security.92
As the twentieth century unfolded, marriage increasingly became viewed as
a source of love, happiness, and emotional fulfillment.93 Sociologist Andrew J.
Cherlin maintains that by the early twentieth century, law and tradition gave
way to companionate marriage, which is based on the love and friendship of a
wife and a husband.94 Cherlin also describes a second transition for marriage,
beginning around 1960, when marriage evolved from “companionate marriage”

86.
87.
88.
89.

HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 398–400.
Id. at 504–11.
Id. at 643–44.
See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15
MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING 33 (2005).
90. See id.
91. Interview with Hendrik Hartog, Professor of History, PRINCETON UNIV., DEPT. OF HISTORY (last
updated
Aug.
17,
2011),
available
at
http://www.princeton.edu/history/people/
display_person.xml?netid=hartog&interview=yes.
92. Id.
93. Cherlin, supra note 89, at 39.
94. Id.
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to what he calls “individualized” marriage.95 Individualized marriages include
families where both spouses were wage-earners and where gender roles within
the family were negotiated between the partners.96 Marital satisfaction came to
be evaluated by people in terms of their own sense of self rather than their sense
of satisfaction about being a competent parent or good spouse.97 Cherlin notes
that while there are still marriages that fit the companionate model, the survival
of companionate marriage is more a reflection of the range of choices modern
spouses have in developing their own roles within their marriage rather than
merely stepping into roles dictated by society.98 “The rewards that people seek
through marriage and other close relationships have also shifted. Individuals
aim for personal growth and deeper intimacy through more open
communication and mutually shared disclosures about feelings with their
partners. They may insist upon changes in a relationship that no longer provides
them with individualized rewards.”99
Research about marriage over the past few decades has consistently
concluded that fewer people now view marriage primarily as an arrangement
offering economic security, and more people see marriage as providing
companionship and its accompanying emotional benefits.100 For example, in a
2001 national survey, a large majority of young women expressed a preference
for a husband who can communicate his feelings over a husband who earns a
good income.101 It appears that college graduates are even less likely than noncollege graduates to see economic security as the main benefit of marriage.102
“For centuries, marriage was viewed as an economic and social institution, and
the emotional and intellectual needs of the spouses were secondary to the
survival of the marriage itself. But in modern relationships, people are looking
for a partnership, and they want partners who make their lives more

95. Id. at 40–41.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., id. at 40–41; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2306 (1994). Some scholars, however, believe that the notion of an
equal partnership is more rhetoric than practice. See, e.g., Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership
Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendency of Self Over the Marriage Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61
(2001) (arguing that despite the widely espoused notion of marriage as a partnership, the earning
spouse’s individual claim to property and income tends to win out when the marriage ends in
divorce).
101. Andrew J. Cherlin, Public Display, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090502652.html.
In the survey, which was conducted by the National Marriage Project, more than 80 percent of
women in their twenties agreed with the statement that it’s more important “to have a husband who
can communicate about his deepest feelings than to have a husband who makes a good living.” Id.
102. “Among non-college graduates—both male and female—around 20 percent agree that
‘financial security is the main benefit of marriage’; while only 6 percent of college graduates thought
this.” BETSEY STEVENSON & ADAM ISEN, COUNCIL ON CONTEMP. FAMILIES, WHO’S GETTING MARRIED?
EDUCATION
AND
MARRIAGE
TODAY
AND
IN
THE
PAST
(2010),
available
at
http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/images/stories/homepage/orange_border/ccf012510.pdf
(reporting result of the General Social Survey).
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interesting.”103 Couples are now looking for relationships that are satisfying and
self-enriching.104
At the same time that people increasingly see marriage as a possible source
of happiness, marriage is no longer viewed as a necessary precursor to happiness
or success in life.105 Surveys reveal that “fewer people now agree with the
statement that married people are happier than unmarried people.”106 One
possible conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that, where couples
marry primarily for happiness rather than for economic security, they are less
likely to expect economic security to continue (if it ever existed) after a divorce.
Just as reasons for marriage have evolved, there have been changes in
attitudes, expectations, and practices surrounding married women engaging in
paid employment. Alimony developed in response to a model in which wives
were economically dependent on husbands who likely earned all of the income
and held title to all of the property.107 Women have long contributed to the
economic well-being of their families by producing household goods and by
working side-by-side with their husbands on family farms and in family
businesses, but divorce could leave a woman destitute in a world where women
had little access to outside employment and a living wage.108 Until the twentieth
century, few married women worked for pay outside the home.109 In 1890, only
4.5 percent of married women held paying jobs in the economy.110 By 1980, 50
percent of married women who were living with their husbands were either
engaged in or seeking paid employment.111 The trend was particularly marked
among married women with young children: between 1950 and 1980, the

103. Tara Parker-Pope, Op-Ed., The Happy Marriage is the “Me” Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2010,
at
WK4,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/weekinreview/
02parkerpope.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=tara%20parker-pope&st=cse.
104. Id.
105. Cherlin, supra note 89, at 40–41.
106. STEVENSON & ISEN, supra note 102. “However, there is one exception: college-educated
women. This trend reflects their marital behavior: in 1988, female college graduates were the least
likely to agree that married people are happier and, by 2002, they were the most likely to agree. A
similar pattern has not occurred among men, rather both those with and without college degrees
became less likely to agree over time.” Id. Stevenson and Isen also found that people with higher
levels of education tend to be happier in their own marriages, and tend to think that other married
people are also happier than are unmarried people. These higher levels of marital happiness are
higher among college-educated people, and do not become significantly less even if other related
factors—such as employment of wives, household income or number of children—vary. Id.
107. See discussion supra Part II.A.
108. For example, under a purely title-based system of property distribution at divorce,
ownership would remain with the spouse in whose name the property was held, usually the
husband, and a court would have little discretion to award property to the wife, even if she had
worked to develop and preserve the property. No common law state currently uses this system.
HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 398.
109. See generally AMERICA’S WORKING WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600 TO THE PRESENT
(Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon eds., 2nd ed. 1995).
110. LINDA J. WAITE, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU & RAND CORP., U.S. WOMEN AT WORK 1–2
(1981), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/R2824.pdf.
111. Id. at 3. These married female workers “made up 56 percent of the female labor force, with a
quarter more still unmarried and the remaining 19 percent divorced, separated, or widowed
women.” Id.
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percentage of married women with children under age six in the labor force went
from 12 percent to 45 percent.112 By 2008, 64 percent of married mothers with
children under age six held jobs outside the home.113 There is no doubt that
working wives provide their families with greater economic security and
financial flexibility, and dual incomes provide the means to achieve a higher
standard of living and a hedge against the possible lay off of one spouse.114
Workforce participation by married women, even married women with young
children, is widely viewed positively as one way in which women can contribute
to the well-being of their families as well as to their own financial security.115
The movement of women into the workforce has changed not only the
employment prospects of the women themselves but also the economic
relationship between many women and their partners.116 Since the 1970s,
women have, on average, made greater gains in education and employment than
men; women’s earnings have increased faster than men’s earnings, and men
were far more likely to have lost their jobs in the current economic downturn.117
Many wives are more educated or earn more money than their husbands.
Between 1970 and 2007, the percentage of husbands with more education than
their wives declined from 28 percent to 19 percent.118 Over that same time
period, the percentage of husbands who had wives with a higher income rose
from 4 percent to 22 percent.119 By 2009, 63 percent of mothers contributed at
least a quarter of their families’ incomes.120 College-educated women are more
likely to marry than ever before, and while they are less likely to divorce, if they
do divorce, they are in theory in better positions to become adequately selfsupporting.121
The alimony situation in this country is affected by the large number of
married mothers engaged in paid employment. The increasing levels of
educated women with job skills raise expectations that women can become selfsupporting after a divorce.122 Similarly, the fact that so many mothers engage in
paid employment during marriage raises expectations that virtually any mother

112.
113.

Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND WORK-FAMILY
SUPPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/us0211webwcover.pdf.
114. WAITE, supra note 110, at 3–4.
115. See generally SUSAN CHIRA, A MOTHER’S PLACE: CHOOSING WORK AND FAMILY WITHOUT
GUILT OR BLAME (1998).
116. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 51, at 157–58 (claiming that women’s relative power in a marriage
varies according to her level of economic contributions to the family).
117. Sam Roberts, More Men Marrying Wealthier Women, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 19, 2010, at A18, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/us/19marriage.html (reporting analysis of census data by
the Pew Research Center, which showed that in “the latest recession, . . . men held about three in four
of the jobs that were lost,” and that “women’s earnings have been increasing faster than men’s since
the 1970s”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 113, at 13.
121. See STEVENSON, supra note 102.
122. See OKIN, supra note 51, at 163–64.
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could become self-supporting if she were sufficiently motivated.123 Issues of
work-family balance present couples with the opportunity to make individual
decisions about whether the mother should remain in the paid workforce or stay
at home with the children during the marriage, but in the event of a divorce, it
becomes difficult to argue that it was necessary the wife stay at home when so
many other families made a different choice. If her staying at home was not
necessary or coerced by the husband, it becomes more difficult to argue that the
wife should be either compensated for staying at home or paid so that she can
continue to stay at home in the future.
In addition, in many states divorce laws have evolved over the past several
decades to favor joint custody of minor children.124 Although couples can opt for
sole custody in one parent and courts can order primary physical custody in one
parent after considering a variety of factors, the clear public policy in most states
is to maximize, whenever possible, the placement time that minor children spend
with their mothers and their fathers.125 When there is no presumption in favor of
a mother receiving custody (and there may even be a presumption against it),
many of the traditional rationales for significant or long-term alimony melt
away.126 If both parents are expected to share post-divorce childcare, both
parents can also be expected to obtain paid employment for the support of
themselves and their children, even if they were not employed during the
marriage.127 In that situation, it will not be necessary to subsidize one parent’s
decision to stay home “for the sake of the children,” and alimony—if any is
awarded—will be geared towards rehabilitating the income capacity of one of
the spouses as rapidly as possible.
Even more problematic is alimony for a stay-at-home mother whose
children are grown. If she has remained at home or reduced her paid
employment throughout her children’s years at home, she may have spent many
years out of the workforce and is much older than competing jobseekers as she
looks to re-enter the job market.128 Yet, except for supporting a brief period of
rehabilitation, it becomes harder for many people to embrace the idea of

123. Id.
124. See, e.g., California. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2004).
125. See, e.g., WIS. STAT § 767.41(2) (2011) (establishing that joint legal custody is presumed); id. at
§ 767.41(4) (noting that the court “shall set a placement schedule that allows the child to have
regularly occurring meaningful periods of placement” and “maximizes the amount of time the child
may spend with each parent”).
126. Historically, alimony has been used to protect women who have specialized in domestic
labor from economic devastation in the event of divorce or abandonment. GARY S. BECKER, A
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 44 (1991). Women with children are most likely to decide to remain home
from work to care for their families when the children are small, and they will often try to re-enter the
workforce when the children are in school or grown. See generally, LESLIE BENNETTS, THE FEMININE
MISTAKE (2007). If the children are absent from a woman’s household not because they are grown or
in school, but because they are at their father’s home for a significant period of time, the mother can
no longer use childcare to justify remaining out of the workforce.
127. The disproportionate amount of time and energy that women spend in child care is likely
the reason that many of those women earn less than men. BECKER, supra note 126, at 56. If men and
women have equal post-divorce childcare responsibilities, it follows that they could be expected to
have equal amounts of time and energy left to invest in paid employment.
128. See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126.
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requiring the payment of alimony to a woman they might see as someone who
made a risky choice that ended badly.129
Of course, the theoretical ability to obtain paid employment is not
necessarily the ability to immediately earn an income that allows self-support at
a standard of living at or near the marital standard of living, even if the spouses
had reasonably equal income potentials at the beginning of the marriage.130
There is a significant wage gap between men and women in the United States;
census figures show that women earn only seventy-seven cents for every dollar
earned by men.131
Although one explanation for this discrepancy is
discrimination, a large part of the difference might be due to the lower income
potential of many female-dominated jobs, such as teaching or nursing, as well as
the fact that female workers work fewer hours on average than do male
workers.132 However, Census Bureau figures show that women are paid less on
average than men for the same occupations, including male-dominated
occupations that presumably pay higher salaries.133
If wage differences are due to gender discrimination, or even individual
preferences for lower paid professions, it may seem unfair to burden an exhusband with alimony to even the score. Yet the lower average number of hours
worked by women, as well as the choice of professions that tend to have more
family-friendly hours, are decisions women often make for the benefit of their
families.134 A significant number of women reduce their hours or leave paid
employment in order to stay home with their children, and husband and wife
may both view this decision as economically rational.135
No matter what a woman’s income potential at the beginning of her
marriage, the decision to leave the paid workforce in favor of staying at home
with the children is economically risky.136 Women who leave paid employment
for even relatively brief periods of time during their marriages may suffer careerlong monetary consequences; even a three-year hiatus may reduce a woman’s
income by one-third.137 Moreover, women who have become stay-at-home

129. See Ellman & Braver, supra note 56 (showing that survey respondents were less likely to
award alimony if the children were grown rather than if they were still in the home).
130. See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126, chs. 4–6 (arguing that women suffer severe and
permanent losses in income from leaving the paid workforce and run the risk of not being able to
enter the workforce except at a low income wage level).
131. Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME, Apr. 20, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html.
132. Carrie Lukas, Op-Ed., There is no Male-Female Wage Gap, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576250672504707048.html
(citing
Department of Labor statistics that full-time working women spend an average of 8.01 hours per day
on the job, compared to the 8.75 hours spent by men).
133. Fitzpatrick, supra note 131 (stating that female secretaries earn 83.4 percent as much as male
secretaries, and female truck drivers earn 76.5 percent as much as male truck drivers).
134. See discussion infra Part III.A.ii.
135. Id.
136. See generally BENNETTS, supra note 126. See also Hekker, supra note 16 (detailing her postdivorce lack of job skills and income, and the subsequent fall in her standard of living).
137. See BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 86–108 (describing the difficulty of rejoining the workforce
after having opted out). Bennetts quotes Sylvia Hewlett, who claims that women lose 37 percent of
their earning power when they leave the workforce for three or more years. Id. at 93.
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mothers for any significant time face significant barriers to re-entering the
workforce.138 One 2005 Center for Work-Life Policy study found that only 40
percent of stay-at-home mothers who want to return to full-time work find fulltime positions; another 34 percent settle for part-time employment.139 These
results do not meet the above-described expectation that a divorced woman can
quickly become self-supporting at a reasonable standard of living without
alimony. Nonetheless, alimony remains scarce.140
III. INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF GUILT AND SHAME
While the family law system has become more uniform and formula-driven
over time, alimony has remained an unpredictable outlier. It may be the case
that the vague, subjective standards, and their seemingly free-wheeling
application, reflect the ambivalence of society in general, or family court judges
and divorcing couples in particular, toward the notion of a continuing stream of
financial support from one ex-spouse to another. Indeed, analyzing alimony
awards—or the lack thereof—is complicated by the fact that both parties and the
judge are involved in the decision-making process.141 If neither party seeks
alimony, or if a party seeking alimony enters a settlement agreement that waives
it, no alimony will be awarded.142 If the parties disagree about alimony, the
judge’s decision will likely be based on a combination of the application of vague
guidelines and deeply held personal values.143
The low percentage of divorce cases in which alimony is ordered does not
only result from courts failing to award alimony, for the vast majority of divorce
cases are settled between the parties or resolved by default.144 Estimates of how
many divorces settle out of court vary from state to state, but all estimates reflect
the fact that the vast majority of cases are settled rather than litigated.145 Thus,

138. See, e.g., Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Op-Ed., The Return: A Stay-at-home Mom Attempts to Go
Back to Work After Nearly Two Decades. Can She Revive Her Career?, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2010, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032902620.html
(chronicling the long, frustrating, but ultimately successful job hunt of a middle-aged woman who
has not worked as a lawyer for seventeen years).
139. Id.
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.
141. Although parties may enter into agreements concerning maintenance either before or during
the marriage, such agreements are only one of many factors that the court must consider when
deciding whether to award maintenance. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.56 (2011).
142. Alimony may be requested—or not—in a divorce petition or response and is a box to be
checked on many court-supplied forms. Although a court may consider factors such as need and
fairness, alimony can be waived by either party. See, e.g., Steinmann v. Steinmann, 749 N.W.2d 145
(Wis. 2008).
143. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33
FAM. L.Q. 801, 809 (1999). Alimony statutes “said no more than that a judge might award it to a
spouse ‘in need,’ but need was in concept and in practice enormously elastic . . . . The absence of any
consensus on the policy rationale for alimony meant that the alimony claimant was effectively
dependent upon the charitable inclinations of the trial judge.” Id.
144. See, e.g., Penelope Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual
Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV.47 1153, 1155–56 (1999) (stating that 90–95 percent of divorce cases are
resolved by default or settlement).
145. See id.
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the paucity of alimony means that in many cases women are waiving it: either
the women do not request alimony to begin with, or they bargain it away during
their settlement negotiations. It may be that lawyers prefer to settle cases and
may pressure their clients to accept settlements, even unfavorable ones.146
The demise of alimony might in some way be related to the fact that
recipients are overwhelmingly female, despite the fact that the award of alimony
is—in theory—gender neutral. Not only social trends but also individual
feelings of guilt or shame may lead women to avoid aggressive pursuit of
alimony awards because women believe they are undeserving of the awards or
are unlikely to obtain them. These guilty and shameful feelings may exacerbate
the disadvantages many women already face when engaging in divorce
mediation or negotiation.147 Meanwhile, social influences that tend to reduce
guilt and shame experienced by divorcing men may make many men adamant
about not paying alimony, and many judges loath to award alimony in contested
cases.148 Belief in gender equality in the workplace, internalized by men and
women alike, has perhaps further eroded the already infrequent award of
alimony for any significant period of time.149
A. Women, Marriage, Divorce, and Guilt
Many women who are technically eligible for alimony decline to
aggressively pursue it. This section argues that these divorcing women feel guilt
and shame about their divorces and the financial circumstances in which they
find themselves at the time of divorce. This guilt comes partly from evolving
societal expectations about marriage, parenthood, and divorce, and partly from
individual emotional tendencies to accept blame for the end of the marriage.150
For one thing, there is evidence that women are socially programmed to feel
responsible for the success or failure of family relationships.151 In addition, social
pressure to be a perfect mother may lead many women to make risky economic
decisions and leave or reduce paid employment to focus on mothering.152 Later,
if this turns out badly, these women may feel guilty or ashamed of having acted
imprudently. Additionally, the spouse who initiates the divorce process more
acutely experiences guilt, and women are more likely to be the divorce
initiators.153 Finally, there is some evidence that women may not negotiate as
effectively as men in situations where alimony is at issue.154 If women feel
undeserving of alimony, they may fail to pursue it, or they may be easily
persuaded by lawyers or judges to settle even if the settlement means that no
alimony will be paid.155

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1234–35.
See discussion infra Part III.A.iv.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 175–80 (1991).
See discussion infra, Part III.A.i.–iii..
See discussion infra Part III.A.i.
See discussion infra Part III.A.ii.
See discussion infra Part III.A.iii.
See discussion infra, Part III.A.iv.
Id.
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The words “guilt” and “shame” are used more or less interchangeably in
ordinary conversation, but in fact they are somewhat different.156 The Oxford
English Dictionary defines “guilt” as “a failure of duty, delinquency; offence,
crime, sin.”157 To feel guilty is to feel a sense of responsibility for some act, but
the mere feeling of guilt does not settle the question of whether the act was, in
fact, wrongful.158 The dictionary definition of “shame,” in contrast, is “[t]he
painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring,
ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s own conduct or circumstances (or in those of
others whose honour or disgrace one regards as one’s own), or of being in a
situation which offends one’s sense of modesty or decency. “159 To feel shame is
to feel like a failure.160
Scholars and clinicians who deal with emotion make similar distinctions,
defining “guilt” as an emotion that is rooted in the conscious acknowledgement
of wrongdoing and is driven by a desire for positive interpersonal relationships
marked by attachment and empathy:161 “[g]uilt is a type of self-punishing anger,
reacting to the perception that one has done a wrong or harm.”162 Shame, on the
other hand, is not act-specific: it pervades the entire self, and is a painful
experience of the perceived failure of the self to attain some ideal condition.163
“In shame, one feels inadequate, lacking some kind of desired type of
completeness or perfection.”164 To put it simply, “guilt comes from failing to
meet your own standards, shame from failing to meet other people’s
standards.”165 In the context of divorce and alimony, this article defines “guilt”
as a painful feeling of failure that results from acting in a way that led to a
divorce or problematic emotional or financial circumstances at the end of a
marriage. This article defines “shame” as a painful feeling of inadequacy and
self-loathing for having failed to attain society’s vision of the perfect spouse,
perfect parent, or perfect marriage.
156. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
157. Id. at 935.
158. A person feels guilt when her behavior does not match her personal values. Nehami Baum,
“Separation Guilt” in Women Who Initiate Divorce, 35 CLIN. SOC. WORK. J. 47, 49 (2006). However,
people may internalize idiosyncratic values not shared by the larger society and thus feel guilty about
things that are not considered wrongful by others. For example, a woman might feel guilty about
staying up late to watch a movie on television, but in itself (and perhaps even in her particular
circumstances) her action may not be wrongful in any meaningful way.
159. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 156, at 162.
160. Jessica Benetti-McQuoid & Krisanne Bursik, Individual Differences in Experiences of and
Responses to Guilt and Shame: Examining the Lenses of Gender and Gender Role, 53 SEX ROLES 133, 134
(2005).
161. “Today, most researchers and clinicians define guilt as an interpersonally driven emotion,
stemming from altruism and fear of harming others. They regard it as rooted in empathy and based
on the need to maintain attachments to others . . . In addition, without rejecting this view, some
writers emphasize the cognitive element of guilt. They locate the roots of guilt in the cognitive
perception of wrongdoing, and identify its affective components as remorse and emotional tension
resulting from the incongruence between the person’s behavior and his or her internalized values.”
Baum, supra note 158, at 49.
162. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 207 (2004).
163. Id. at 184.
164. Id. See also Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, supra note 160, at 134.
165. Suanne Kelman, What is it About Women & Guilt?, 66 CHATELAINE 55, 55 (1993).
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The concepts of guilt and shame remain somewhat overlapping because one
can trigger the other.166 For example, a husband may feel guilty for having
broken his marriage vows by having an affair, and he may try to reignite his love
for his wife. If his efforts are not successful, he may feel ashamed of being a
husband who has failed to remain loyal and loving and who has been dishonest
in his marriage. His feeling of shame may make him feel bad enough that he acts
in a cold or angry way towards his wife, and he may then feel guilty over his
harsh or insensitive actions. Moreover, guilt and shame may be experienced
simultaneously in response to certain situations. The unfaithful husband in the
above example may feel guilt over the act of having an affair or speaking harshly
to his wife, and he may feel shame for being an unfaithful or nasty spouse.
i. Women and Emotional Vulnerability
Guilt is a natural part of the divorce process, just as guilt is a natural part of
many experiences involving loss or separation.167 Both men and women may
experience guilt over acts prior to, during, or after the divorce process. There is
reason to believe, however, that women are especially affected by guilt and
shame. In the first place, women may be socially programmed to accept
responsibility for facilitating family relationships and to accept blame—and feel
guilty—when there is a breakdown in those relationships because women are
traditionally conditioned to grow into the caretakers of other family members.168
Research on male-female gender roles concludes that men tend “to adopt more
assertive, controlling and independent behaviors,” while women tend to “occupy
communal roles leading to the development of caring, nurturing, sensitive
behaviors, and concern with others’ welfare.”169 Although both men and women
practice love and care of individuals, there are gender differences in how care
work is defined for each gender.170 Since most societies assign assertive,
dominant, and independent roles to men, men’s caring traditionally tends to be
defined as breadwinning and attendance at significant family events, while
women have been expected to perform the day-to-day tasks of caring.171 Thus,
Professor Kathleen Lynch characterizes men as “care commanders” and women

166. NUSSBAUM, supra note 162, at 207–08.
167. Baum, supra note 158, at 48. See also PAULINE H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, The Emotional
Roller Coaster of Divorce in COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE
YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE 13, 13–39 (Pauline H. Tesler &
Peggy Thompson eds., 2006), available at http://www.womansdivorce.com/emotional-stages-ofdivorce.html. The guilt may be mixed with shame: one recently divorced woman wrote about feeling
she was on “the ledge of personal and profound failure” on the day she got her divorce decree. Lisa
del Rosso, Op-Ed., Saying “I Don’t” to Release the Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at ST 5,
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/fashion/23Modern.html?pagewanted-all.
168. Kelman, supra note 165, at 55.
169. Cynthia D. Mohr et al., Daily Interpersonal Experiences and Distress: Are Women More
Vulnerable? 22 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (2003) (citing Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in
Social Behavior: Comparing Social Role Theory and Evolutionary Psychology, 1997 AM. PSYCHOL. 1380
(1997)).
170. Kathleen Lynch, Affective Equality: Who Cares?, 52 DEV. 410, 411 (2009).
171. Id. at 411–12. The way Lynch sees it, men fulfill society’s expectations if they support the
family and show up for family events like weddings and funerals, whereas women fulfill society’s
expectations by doing routine feeding, nursing, chauffeuring, etc. Id.
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as “care footsoldiers.”172
Although individual women may agree to share caring responsibilities for
their families with their husbands, some psychologists believe that women
remain more prone to feel both a continued sense of responsibility for the family
relationships and a feeling of guilt if there are difficulties in the relationships.173
For example, Lynch characterizes care work as falling into two distinct
categories, which she calls “love labouring” and “secondary care labouring.”174
Lynch defines love labour as “the emotional and other work oriented to the
enrichment and enablement of others, and the bond between self and others.”175
She argues that it cannot be readily reassigned.176 Thus, time spent cuddling or
playing with the children is less likely to be scheduled and more likely to be
jealously guarded by a single parent.177 Lynch defines secondary care labouring
as practical tasks that can be undertaken in the care of a family member, and she
suggests that this kind of caring responsibility can be shared or reassigned in a
contractual way.178 So, for example, mothers and fathers might agree that one
will drive the school carpool in the morning while the other will drive in the
afternoon. Lynch then claims that women are morally impelled by social custom
(and sometimes law) to do love labour for family members, and that women’s
sense of self and individual worth is inextricably linked to this unequal care
burden.179
If Lynch’s theory is correct, the mere reallocation of household
responsibilities seen in many modern Western marriages would not alleviate the
feelings of guilt and shame associated with women failing to fulfill the caring
(love labour) roles in the marriage and likely would not reduce the amount of
love labour performed by women even if men agreed to share the burden.
Indeed, there is evidence that this may be the case.180 Since the 1960s, men in the
United States have, on average, doubled their contributions to housework and
tripled the amount of time they spend caring for their children.181 Although the

172. Id. at 411.
173. Id. at 412–13.
174. Id. at 413. A similar concept, “emotional labor,” has been in the psychological literature for
at least twenty-five years since the term was coined by Arlie Hochschild. See Mary Ellen Guy &
Meredith A. Newman, Women’s Jobs, Men’s Jobs: Sex Segregation and Emotional Labor, 64 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 289 (2001) (arguing that emotional labor is undervalued both at home and in paid workplaces,
where its performance by women in female-dominated jobs leads to lower pay in those jobs).
175. Lynch, supra note 170, at 413.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 413. Lynch claims that “only certain aspects of care could be handed over to others or
paid for at times without undermining the relational identity of both carer and care recipient.” Id.
She notes that while “secondary care labouring . . . can be commodified . . . love labouring work
cannot be commodified without being fundamentally altered and rendered as something else.” Id.
179. “The fact that love labouring must be done and that women are the people assigned to do it,
this means that women’s sense of self, their sense of being of worth as a woman is tied up with taking
a very unequal burden of caring.” Id.
180. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents Spending More Time With Children, Study
Finds,
N.Y.TIMES,
Oct.
17,
2006,
available
at
http://nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/
17kids.html?pagewanted.
181. See BGU Study Shows Women and Men Equally Share Housework, AM. ASSOCIATES BEN-GURION
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extra housework performed by men has somewhat lessened the burden on
women (especially women who are employed outside the home), the effect of
increased male participation in childcare is more complicated.182 Women—who
already spent comparatively large amounts of time performing childcare
duties—also increased the amount of time spent on childcare over the same
period of time.183 This data supports Lynch’s suggestion that women find it
extremely difficult to give up love labour, particularly in connection with their
children. Even in the face of increased childcare by fathers, mothers increased
their childcare time.184 Perhaps both mothers and fathers were at least partly
responding to social expectations linking good parenting with more time spent
with children.
Several studies confirm that women are somehow predisposed to have a
greater sense of responsibility for the success of family relations and to
experience more intense negative emotions (such as guilt and shame) when the
relationships encounter difficulties.185 In one study, Spanish researchers placed
subjects in conflict situations and discovered that men and women experienced
different emotional reactions, and that women’s reactions tended to be more
intense.186 Similarly, another study found that women were more emotionally
aware than their male partners when faced with difficult or conflict situations
specific to their relationship as a couple.187 Many researchers also agree that
women are more likely to become upset by events that threaten their
relationships.188 Other researchers conclude that women’s greater tendency to

UNIV. OF THE NEGEV (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.aabgu.org/media-center/news-releases/studyshows-women-and-men-share-housework.html.
182. See Pear, supra note 180; Oriel Sullivan & Scott Coltrane, Men’s Changing Contributions to
Housework
and
Childcare,
COUNCIL
ON
CONTEMPORARY
FAMILIES
(2008),
http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/marriage-partnership-divorce/menchange.html?q=coltrane
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
183. Id. Research by Suzanne Bianchi claims that between 1965 and 2000, married mothers
increased the average time spent on childcare from 10.6 hours per week to 12.9 hours per week. Id.
Sullivan and Coltrane claim that women doubled the amount of time spent in “childcare and
interaction with children” between 1965 and 2003. Sullivan and Coltrane, supra note 182. This
discrepancy is most likely due to a different definition of “childcare,” which can range from feeding
and carpooling to cuddling and nurturing.
184. See Pear, supra note 180.
185. See, e.g., Women Have More Intense Emotions than Men When Conflict Arises Within the Couple,
2011 PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY J. 300 (discussing a study conducted by Inmaculada Valor Segura,
Francisca Exposito and Miguel Moya of the Department of Social Psychology, University of Granada,
Spain).
186. Id. at 300.
187. Kristin L. Croyle & Jennifer Waltz, Emotional Awareness and Couples’ Relationship Satisfaction,
28 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 435, 441 (2002). The authors noted that in contrast to their own study,
another study had shown that women had greater emotional awareness in general compared to men
as a group, rather than only in relation to their partners. They hypothesized that either sample sizes
or the different methods of gathering data might have accounted for the more limited gender
difference in their own study. Id. at 441–42.
188. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 169, at 394 (citing Rand D. Conger et al., Husband and Wife
Differences in Response to Undesirable Life Events, 34 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 71 (1993) (finding that
married women were more likely than their husbands to be upset by negative family events like
marital separation or illness)); Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Judith Larson & Carla Grayson, Explaining the
Gender Difference in Depressive Symptoms, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061 (1999) (finding that
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ruminate over negative events tends to generate greater negative feelings in
women than men.189 Lastly, many psychologists believe women (more than
men) are socialized to judge their own value in relation to the success of their
interpersonal relationships and experience a loss of self-esteem if those
relationships falter.190
ii. Guilt-Ridden Mamas
The tendency of women to experience more intense emotions and a greater
sense of responsibility for the success of family relationships may account for the
fact that women appear to be especially prone to feelings of guilt and shame over
failure to attain the ideal of the perfect mother.191 Over the past century, social
expectations of women have grown so that many women feel pressured to excel
in competing workplace and home roles.192 The modern American ideal of
motherhood encourages women to obsessively seek perfection in their children’s
meals, toys, play groups, schools (beginning as early as preschool), and sports.193
Studies show that mothers spend more time with their children than they did a
generation ago even though greater numbers of those same women today work
in paid employment as well.194 Although women devote greater amounts of time
and energy to mothering than ever before, messages from experts, promulgated
by the media, leave many mothers feeling stressed, guilty, and inadequate.195
Social pressure to be a perfect mother may lead many married women to make
the risky economic decision to forgo paid employment and stay home with their
children. If their marriages subsequently end in divorce, women may feel guilt
and shame over their now vulnerable financial situations and the need to return
to paid employment rather than remain at home with their children.
While couples no longer marry primarily for economic security, and

women were more likely to experience symptoms of depression when there were chronic household
or interpersonal strains)).
189. Mohr, supra note 169, at 397 (discussing research by Suls, Green & Hillis which suggests that
“negative events may affect women’s mood over the course of hours, not days”).
190. For example, one study showed that despite fairly widespread societal acceptance of
divorce, some women have the experience of being deserted by friends or family. “Many women
believed they were the source of the problem, experienced feelings of guilt, felt like a failure, became
depressed, and developed physical ailments, such as headaches and eating disorders. Lacking
support, the women turned emotions inward and experienced a lack of self-esteem.” Cindy Thomas
& Marilyn Ryan, Women’s Perception of the Divorce Experience: A Qualitative Study, 49 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 210, 220 (2008).
191. See, e.g., SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN (2005); Emma-Kate
Symons, Mama, You’re on Her Mind, THE AUSTL., June 12, 2010, available at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/mama-youre-on-her-mind/story-e6frg6z61225878423523 (discussing French feminist Elisabeth Badinter’s LE CONFLIT LA FEMME ET LA MERE, a
work criticizing social pressure on women to be perfect mothers).
192. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (Penguin Books
2003) (1989).
193. See generally DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191.
194. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 192.
195. See, e.g., DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191, at 5–9 (describing “the new momism” in
which media promulgates the view that mothers must perfectly manage every aspect of their
children’s lives or risk disaster).
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spouses no longer expect such security in the event of a divorce, women often
continue to put themselves in economically vulnerable situations by reducing or
giving up their participation in the paid labor force. Many unique variables are
at play. At the very least, women with children need to take maternity leave
because of biological realities.196 Couples may decide it is more economically
efficient for one spouse to work and for the other to leave the job track altogether
and stay home, but this comes with distinct career advancement and economic
risks.197 As columnist Ellen Goodman notes: “[w]e still haven’t made work bend
to the arc of life and love. Nor have we made it easy to opt back into the
workforce after you opt out.”198
Additionally, for significant numbers of women, even in the face of a high
divorce rate, no individual believes going into a marriage that divorce will
happen to her.199 Married couples typically enter marriage with the optimistic
expectation of sharing their lives permanently.200 This sharing includes
economic and social resources with both spouses engaging in home and market
labor in collaborative ways for the good of the family.201 At a certain point, some
women opt out of the paid workforce to reduce the competing demands and to
assuage the feelings of guilt and shame associated with leaving their children in
the care of others.202
Consider a series of posts on Lisa Belkin’s popular New York Times blog,
Motherlode.203 Anna, a woman with a three-month-old baby, writes asking the
advice of other blog readers about her desire to scale back her career so as to
spend more time with her new baby.204 Many Motherlode readers posted
suggestions, as well as expressions of support, for Anna’s desire to remain home
with her baby.205 More than four hundred postings offered advice, but only a
small percentage cautioned Anna to consider what leaving the workforce would
do to her financial prospects in the event of the end of her marriage through
death or divorce.206 In a later post, Anna wrote that her employer rejected her

196. Recovery time from childbirth varies depending on an individual’s health, type of delivery,
and any complications, but since a postpartum doctor’s checkup is typically scheduled for six weeks
after the birth, it seems reasonable that at least that amount of time would be typical for significant
(but not necessarily total) physical recovery. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, Pregnancy: Recovering
from
Birth,
Women’s
Health,
http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/childbirthbeyond/recovering-from-birth.cfm.
197. See generally BENNETTS , supra note 126.
198. Ellen Goodman, Desperate Ex-Housewives, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2006, at A17.
199. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongoing
Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 121 (2008).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 126–27.
202. See discussion infra Part III.A.ii. See also PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY
QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME (2007). Popular culture is replete with tales of women who have
made just such a choice. See, e.g., ALLISON PEARSON, I DON’T KNOW HOW SHE DOES IT (2002).
203. See generally Lisa Belkin, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE, http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com.
204. Lisa Belkin, Scaling Back Career for Baby, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (July 6, 2009, 12:00 PM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/asking-a-boss-for-a-part-time-schedule/.
205. Id.
206. Id. Of the 427 comments I counted, only thirteen mentioned the possibility of a future
divorce as a consideration over whether to leave a job. Fourteen comments mentioned that
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proposal to work part time, so Anna quit her job to be home with her baby.207
The positive response by many blog readers to Anna’s decision to remain at
home with her baby reflects the pattern shared by many married couples: each
spouse makes different contributions to the family at different points in time.208
Despite patterns of work that are different, and sometimes unequal, the
allocation of duties is likely to be regarded as fair by the spouses, at least while
the marriage continues.209 In particular, the decision to have the woman stay
home to engage primarily in child care may be seen as economically rational
since the woman is often the lower-earning spouse in the marketplace,210 and
freedom from the constraints of juggling childcare and paid work may improve
the husband’s career success.
However, when one spouse remains at home, the actual impact on the
marital relationship is complicated.211 Although the stay-at-home mother is
presumably the primary caretaker of the children, her husband is likely to be
more involved in the lives of those children than fathers were in previous
generations.212 As mentioned previously, over the past few decades men have,
on average, increased the amount of time and energy they devote to family
activities.213 At the same time, many mothers who are staying home with the
children are considered to be engaged in paid labor even if they only work a few
hours for pay, and thus they are typically not on par with their husbands in
terms of either time spent in paid employment or income earned there.214 Thus,
the idealized notion of separate-but-equal home and marketplace spheres (a
notion popular in the 19th century as well as in the 1950s)215 is somewhat
blurred.
Although notions of marriage as an equal social and economic relationship
are popular, there are indications that gender equality is not complete during
most marriages, especially ones in which the distribution of wage earning and
childcare are unbalanced.216 The higher earning partner (usually the husband)

remaining in the workforce was a good idea in case something happened to the husband or to his job.
A more robust fifty-five comments mentioned the serious long-term career disadvantages to
dropping out of the paid workforce. Some comments mentioned more than one risk. Comments to
Belkin, Scaling Back Career for Baby, supra note 204.
207. Lisa Belkin, Quitting a Job to Raise a Child, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (July 15, 2009, 4:24 PM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/resigning-to-raise-a-child/.
208. Kelly, supra note 199, at 129–30.
209. Id. (citing Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1977 (2000)).
210. See infra Part III.B.
211. See, e.g., Sullivan & Coltrane, supra note 182.
212. Id. See also, Pear, supra note 180.
213. See Sullivan & Coltrane, supra note 182.
214. See ANN CRITTENDON, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 18 (2001). A woman only needs to work one hour per year in
order to be counted for statistical purposes as employed outside the home. Id.
215. See id. at 47–49 (discussing the separate spheres of work and home in the 19th century). See
also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP,
23–41 (1992) (describing traditional stay-at-home mothers and working fathers in the 1950s and how
that model has been idealized ever since).
216. CRITTENDON, supra note 214, at 111–15.

McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete)

66 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

3/13/2012 10:14 AM

Volume 19:41 2011

may have greater decision-making power in the family.217 When one partner is
earning little or no money, the power imbalance may be even more skewed.
In a divorce, the legal system colludes in devaluing the non-market
contributions of the party who is primarily engaged in home and childcare labor,
which is traditionally labeled “women’s work.”218 The current system clearly
expects that the former stay-at-home mothers will return to paid employment
and that they will become self-supporting as soon as possible.219 As previously
discussed, this is not necessarily a realistic scenario because of employment
disadvantages stemming from interrupted employment.220
Moreover, wives may experience guilt and shame over their lost earning
power or over the marriage failure.221 A decision to reduce or forgo outside
employment in order to care for the children, once perceived as an unselfish
contribution to the family, might at the time of separation appear to the wife as
something she did that led inexorably to the divorce.222 The rise of guilt
experienced by women with children has been exacerbated over the past several
decades by a phenomenon often referred to as “The Mommy Wars.”223 In
debates that appear in print, in person, and on talk radio and television,
emotions run high over whether women with children, especially pre-school age
children, should engage in paid employment outside of the home.224 Proponents
of stay-at-home mothering claim that children are better off if mom stays home
with them full time and are seriously disadvantaged in terms of health,
happiness, and future development if she does not.225 Proponents of working
mothers claim that children are better off if there is adequate income for the
family and if their mothers are happy and fulfilled—a state that not every
woman can achieve while remaining at home full time.226 Moreover, advocates
for working mothers claim that children actually benefit from the employment of
their mothers because they have greater independence and the advantage of the
mother as a role model.227
Two aspects of “The Mommy Wars” are relevant to the discussion of
alimony. First, there has been an important change to the terminology.228 Today
it is rare to hear anyone refer to the wife at home as a “housewife;” the preferred

217. Id.
218. Kelly, supra note 199, at 144.
219. HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 457–58.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 130–140.
221. See supra Part III.A.
222. See, e.g., BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 59 (describing a woman who quit her job as a lawyer to
stay home but feels worried and guilty about the stress on her husband who now has the entire
“huge burden” of supporting the family).
223. See, e.g., DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 191, at 12–13.
224. See generally Laura Schlessinger, Dr. Laura’s Blog, DR.LAURA.COM, www.drlaurablog.com/,
(last updated Oct. 7, 2011). But see CHIRA, supra note 115, at 259–63.
225. A leading proponent of this view is Dr. Laura Schlessinger, a radio host known for
castigating female callers who do not stay home full-time to raise their children. See generally
Schlessinger, supra note 224.
226. CHIRA, supra note 115, at 259–63.
227. See, e.g., id.
228. Id. at 18.
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term has become a “stay-at-home mother.”229 The implication is that the decision
to stay home is tied to the existence of children living at home, and the corollary
is that when the children leave home, the mother is free to work outside the
home. Second, the rhetoric, while extolling the virtues of all child rearing and
homemaking, emphasizes that crucial period when children are pre-school
age.230 Once children are in school, there is no philosophical reason to demand
that their mothers remain at home. In a nation where the norm is two children
per family, and many school districts provide 4-year-old kindergartens, this will
likely result in only five to ten years where even the staunchest proponent of
staying home for the good of the children is adamant that a mother must be at
home with her children.231 In fact, with expensive sports camps, private music or
dance lessons, and ever-rising college costs, it could be argued that returning to
at least part-time paid employment is for the benefit of the children. This does
present quite a conundrum for mothers: staying home provides their children
with certain benefits, but many children also benefit from increased family
income. Staying home with the children is likely a temporary phase for many
women, with the possible exception of the most religiously traditional and the
most economically privileged.232 Yet, as we have seen, even a temporary
departure from paid employment can cause severe economic disadvantages.233
The question then becomes how women expect those disadvantages to be
apportioned in the event of a divorce.
In an online essay entitled “Stay-At-Home Parenting After Divorce,” Amber
Hinds argues that if the spouses agree that mom staying home is best for the
children, this agreement should be upheld even in the face of divorce because
divorce does not change the belief that the kids are best off with one parent at
home.234 Comments posted by readers were split in response. Many online
commenters responded that divorce changes everything and that the extra
expenses of supporting two households preclude one parent from staying at
home in all but the most economically privileged households.235 Some
commenters argue that divorce, like death or job loss, is a foreseeable risk, and it
is in the interest of any children for their mother to provide for such risks by
remaining employed or at least readily employable.236 Other commenters
applaud the notion that divorced mothers remain at home raising their

229. Id.
230. See, e.g., id. at 17 (relating that many advocate that mothers stay home with their children
but, if necessary, can work part-time once their children are in school).
231. Of course, parents who opt to homeschool their children voluntarily lengthen the time when
a parent must be at home, but there is nothing about placing a high value on stay-at-home mothering
that requires homeschooling.
232. “Women with high-earning husbands obviously have more options than those who are
struggling merely to survive.” BENNETTS, supra note 126, at 30.
233. Supra text accompanying notes 130–39.
234. Belkin, Divorce and the Stay-at-Home-Mom, supra note 68.
235. See, e.g., noel, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; SarahB, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68;
J.Lee, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; AMNY, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
236. See, e.g., Fiona, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Mouse, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68;
D.J, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; katehem, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68.
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children.237 Still others lamented the economic folly of a woman who is the
mother of six children dropping out of the paid workforce and putting herself in
a position where she cannot support her family.238
Women who face divorce after having opted to stay home with the children
may experience guilt and shame over the marriage failure, as well as guilt and
shame over getting themselves into a financially vulnerable situation that is
judged harshly by friends and relatives who share some of the more critical
views posted in reaction to Hinds’ essay. This provides another possible
rationale for women entering settlement agreements that allow for little or no
alimony.
iii. The Guilt of Divorce Initiation
Divorce also triggers guilt and shame when the person who initiates the
divorce feels guilty not just over the failure of the marriage, but also over the act
of initiating the legal end of the marriage.239 Psychological studies consistently
show strong feelings of guilt experienced by the divorce initiator, defined by the
literature as “the spouse who first proposes the divorce and is firmer in its
pursuit.”240 Studies show that initiators tend to feel guilty while non-initiators
feel rejected.241
Women, the usual recipients of alimony, may be at especially high risk for
feelings of guilt incident to a divorce because women are statistically much more
likely to be the divorce initiators.242 Most studies show that women initiate
divorce at twice the rate of men.243 Since divorce involves separation and
initiating it is “a willful departure,” initiating divorce may cause separation guilt
similar to the guilt experienced by young children who must psychologically
break away from parents who cling to them in an unhealthy way.244
Psychologists identify this guilt, which includes a tendency to self-punish,
237. See, e.g., Alexis, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Catherine, Comment to Belkin, supra note
68.
238. See, e.g., Mouse, Comment to Belkin, supra note 68; Liz Delaney, Comment to Belkin, supra
note 68.
239. Baum, supra note 158, at 47.
240. Id. “Myers (1989), a psychiatrist who studied the male experience in divorce, suggests that
men feel guilty when they initiate the divorce: for no longer loving their wives and for wanting to
leave them. He found the guilt to be particularly strong among middle-aged professional men who
had left traditional marriages in which their wives had devoted most of their adult years to being a
wife, raising the children, and running the home. Emery (1994), who traces the emotional and
psychological processes that initiators and non-initiators undergo in divorce, shows how guilt
underlies these processes in initiators. Over time, he claims, the initiator’s sense of guilt creates a
guilty sense of responsibility and feelings of dutiful caring.” Id. at 49 (citing MICHAEL F. MYERS, MEN
AND DIVORCE (1989); ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (1994)).
241. Baum, supra note 158, at 48. See also CONSTANCE R. AHRONS & ROY H. RODGERS, DIVORCED
FAMILIES: A MULTIDICIPLINARY DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 62 (1987).
242. Baum, supra note 158, at 48.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 49 (citing Arnold H. Modell, The Origin of Certain Forms of Pre-oedipal Guilt and the
Implications for a Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects, 52 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 337–46 (1971); Arnold
Modell, On Having the Right to a Life: An Aspect of the Superego’s Development, 46 INT’L J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 323–31 (1965)).
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as a pattern that may originate in childhood if a child is led by dysfunctional
parents to believe that the child’s normal independence has somehow harmed
the parent.245 In response, a child might act in a self-destructive way to either
maintain ties with the parent or try to comply with that parent’s wishes.246
Joseph Weiss studied the phenomenon of separation guilt.247 Although he and
other psychologists specifically addressed it in the context of feelings
experienced by children (both young or adult) toward their parents, a similar
pattern may emerge between divorcing spouses.248 Guilt over initiating the
divorce may lead the party to take actions that are self-punishing or otherwise
not in his or her best interest.
Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, researchers who have done
empirical studies of divorcing families, found that the parent who chose to
terminate the marriage was more likely to ask for less if it was the wife or, in the
husband’s case, was more inclined to financial largesse in child support or
alimony settlement.249 Hallmarks of separation guilt, such as continuing
emotional ties out of guilt or acting to appease the injured party, are often
evident in divorce situations.250 For example, in the context of financial disputes
in a divorce, maintaining or increasing ties to the injured party might entail
agreeing to pay alimony, which continues a financial interdependence.
Complying in a self-tormenting way with the injured party’s real or imagined
wishes might entail either paying alimony (if the guilt-ridden spouse is the
primary wage earner) or forgoing alimony (if the guilt-ridden spouse is the
financially disadvantaged partner).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that divorce initiation as a source of guilt in
women appears to be more likely among younger women because research
shows that women over age forty-five are less likely to initiate divorce than are
younger women, probably because women in their mid-forties and older have
fewer prospects for remarriage and are likely to be more dependent on their
husbands’ income.251 These women know that they are likely unable to support
themselves at the marital standard of living after having been partly or entirely
supported by their husbands for such a long period of time.252 Older women are
less likely to initiate divorce and are thus less likely to experience the guilt one
may feel as a result of initiating divorce proceedings.
245. Joseph Weiss, Unconscious Guilt, in THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS: THEORY, CLINICAL
OBSERVATION, AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 43, 51 (Joseph Weiss et al. eds., 1986).
246. Id. at 51.
247. See generally Weiss supra note 245, at n.288.
248. Baum, supra note 158, at 48.
249. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 23 (1996).
250. See Catherine Groves Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting of
Alimony on the Spouses, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 282 (1939).
251. June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43,
75 (2002). This is related to the fact that men and women benefit from the marriage at different times:
men tend to benefit most early in the relationship, while women benefit most later in the relationship.
Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 597 n.220
(citing Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987)).
252. See Estin, supra note 251, at 555.
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iv. Women’s Patterns of Behavior in Settlement Negotiations and Mediation
Most likely, the feelings of guilt and shame experienced by women during
the divorce process exacerbate the gender-based differences in the negotiating
behaviors of those women. Women who have feelings of guilt and shame over
becoming economically dependent on a man may be less forceful in negotiating
for continued support. They may believe that they do not deserve alimony or
that getting an award of alimony is a hopeless endeavor.
A final factor in the dwindling numbers of alimony awards is the different
perspective women bring to the divorce bargaining process. Some researchers,
such as Carol Gilligan, claim that women often bring different values into
negotiations, and that these values may disadvantage women under certain
circumstances.253 Gilligan argues that women resolve conflict in human
relationships by focusing on care of others rather than by focusing on justice.254
Other scholars agree that this preference for cooperation and for care of others
disadvantages women in negotiation settings, such as divorce settlement
negotiations, presumably because women seem more likely to sacrifice economic
advantages in furtherance of non-monetary goals.255 For example, women
frequently agree to poor settlement terms in order to gain custody of their
children.256 Women, more than men, treat relational issues and interpersonal
goals as more important than the goal of achieving specific outcomes in
negotiations.257 Women’s lack of social power relative to men, as well as
women’s tendencies to live up to social expectations that they will be nice and
non-aggressive, may also adversely impact the outcomes for women.258
Recent research in the context of salary negotiations illustrates important
differences between the way women and men bargain.259 In a series of
experiments, Laura J. Kray and Michele J. Gelfand demonstrate that when a first
offer is accepted in a negotiation, women tend to be more relieved than men.260
Additionally, in employment negotiations, women emphasize goals of enhancing
or maintaining personal relationships to a greater degree than men.261 These
experiments also show that women tend to be more sensitive to clarity, or lack of
clarity, in negotiating norms, and women are more emotionally attuned than

253. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
254. Id. at 105. “Women [see] moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities. . .The
sequence of women’s moral judgment proceeds from an initial concern with survival to a focus on
goodness and finally to a reflective understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the
resolution of conflicts in human relationships.” Id.
255. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 110 (2008) (citing Carol M. Rose, Women and
Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 423–33 (1992)).
256. Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 745
n.183 (2000).
257. Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 115.
258. Id. at 117–20.
259. Laura J. Kray & Michele J. Gelfand, Relief Versus Regret: The Effect of Gender and Negotiating
Norm Ambiguity on Reactions to Having One’s First Offer Accepted, 27 SOC. COGNITION 418 (2009).
260. Id. at 423.
261. Id. at 427.
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men to nuances in negotiation context.262 The studies demonstrate that
“[w]omen and men experience the bargaining process differently, have different
beliefs and motivations during negotiations, and are treated differently for the
exact same behavior by their negotiating counterparts.”263 Women tend to be
more anxious about the negotiation process than men.264 Women also tend to
attain less favorable outcomes from negotiations than men.265
Extrapolating these findings to the divorce context, if women focus on
caring and preserving relationships, they may be reluctant to rock the boat and
push for alimony, particularly when there are children from the marriage. Many
women will make financial concessions in exchange for custody.266 Further,
although it is obvious that in the vast majority of cases the existence of minor
children require the divorcing parents to maintain some kind of relationship in
order to coordinate placement times and child-related decisions, even adult
children present situations where it is better for all concerned if the divorced
partners can relate to each other in a civil manner.267 Family events, such as
weddings, graduations, and the arrival of grandchildren, all present
opportunities for contact among members of the extended family, including the
ex-spouses. Research such as that by Kray and Gelfand suggests that women
may be more sensitive to these relationship issues and may temper their
bargaining accordingly, especially with respect to ambiguous and controversial
issues such as alimony.268 Conversely, their soon-to-be-ex-husbands may feel
that it is only just that the husbands be able to sever economic ties with their
wives who should be able to get jobs and support themselves.
Moreover, the women in the Kray and Gelfand studies display high
sensitivity to “negotiating norms” and less regret about having their first offer
accepted when high ambiguity about the importance and appropriateness of
bargaining existed.269 Since alimony awards are unpredictable and are not
clearly supported by society,270 the importance or appropriateness of bargaining
over alimony is highly ambiguous. Some studies show that women are less
likely to achieve favorable negotiation outcomes compared to men when the
situation is highly ambiguous.271 Negotiations over alimony may be emotional
and highly contentious, the husband may be angry, and the lawyer may be
telling the wife that she cannot count on getting an alimony award if she goes to
court. Thus, women may follow the patterns described by Kray and Gelfand by

262. Id. at 433.
263. Id. at 420.
264. Id. at 429.
265. “Overall, men tend to behave more competitively and reap better outcomes than women at
the bargaining table.” Id. at 420 (citing Stulmacher & Walters, 1999).
266. See Bryan, supra note 144, at 1201.
267. See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 116.
268. Kray and Gelfand found that compared to men, women had greater anxiety in negotiations,
were more likely to accept the first offer, and cared more about the happiness of their bargaining
partner. Kray & Gelfand, supra note 259, at 427. Given how unhappy alimony might make a man, it
stands to reason that women might settle for less than they need or want.
269. Id. at 433.
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 123.
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negotiating anxiously and agreeing readily to the first proposal in order to
preserve relationships and placate their soon-to-be-ex-spouses, or even their
lawyers.
In addition, studies show that the sense of personal entitlement is different
for women and men, particularly if there is limited information about relative
value.272 In one study where male and female students were assigned a task and
then told to pay themselves a fair wage, women worked longer and more
efficiently but paid themselves less, on average, than the men.273 There is also
evidence that men tie their salary to their perception of their economic worth,
while women tie their worth as employees to what the company is willing to
pay.274 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Deborah Small concluded that in the divorce
settlement context, men value themselves as worth more than women value
themselves.275 Women tie their self-assessment of worth to what the legal system
concludes is a woman’s entitlement at the time of divorce.276 Since modern
divorce law eschews alimony except as a short-term method of rehabilitation or
retribution, the legal system does not entitle the woman to alimony. It is
therefore logical to conclude that many women will conclude that they are
undeserving of alimony, and thus they will not pursue it.277
Author Ann Crittenden provides an example of this phenomenon in her
book “The Price of Motherhood.”278 She describes the case of “Kate,” a mother of
two whose husband left her for another woman after twenty-five years of
marriage.279 Originally employed in a high-paying job, Kate had become a stayat-home mother.280 Her lawyer and two court-appointed mediators discouraged
her from seeking alimony, arguing that what her husband “gave” her would be
sufficient to live on and, further, that no judge would award her alimony.281
Crittenden quotes Armin Kuder, a prominent Washington D.C. divorce lawyer:
“[i]f the wife is under fifty, and there are no kids to take care of, and she’s not
drooling or otherwise totally incompetent, the court will say this person has to
become self-sufficient. You can forget long-term alimony.”282 Lawyers often
discourage a fight for alimony presumably because a woman could end up in a
worse economic position by expending time and money to pursue alimony when

272. Id. at 125.
273. Id. at 126 (citing Brenda Major, Dean B. McFarlin & Diana Gagnon, Overworked and
Underpaid: On the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1399 (1984)).
274. Id. at 126 (citing Linda Barron, Ask and You Shall Receive?: Gender Differences in Negotiators’
Beliefs About Requests for a Higher Salary, 56 HUM. REL. 635 (2003)).
275. Id. at 127.
276. Id.
277. See supra Part II.A. Even if lawyers represent these women, the lawyers may well counsel
against a protracted court battle with uncertain results. See, e.g., Arthur E. Balbirer, Settle, Settle,
Settle: Why Letting the Judge Decide Should Be Your Last Resort, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 38, 38 (2011) (noting the
human weaknesses of judges and claiming that “wild card” issues make it advisable to settle).
278. CRITTENDON, supra note 214, at 141–43.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 141–42.
282. Id. at 145.
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the awards are so unlikely and the litigation costs are so high.283 Thus many
women, already having a propensity to try to keep everyone happy and now
facing opposition from their own lawyers as well as their husbands, are likely to
abandon the pursuit of alimony.
B. Men, Marriage, Guilt, and Alimony
Certainly, divorcing husbands also often experience guilt over their failed
marriages. In the past, some men paid alimony out of guilt, at least in cases
where the husband felt responsible for abandoning the marriage or where the
children were experiencing financial hardship while in the custody of their
mothers.284 Nevertheless, this pattern of male guilt appears less common at this
point in history.285 Alimony now seems less essential to the continued well-being
of women and children due to the rise of two-income families and the
accompanying shift in gender roles, especially with respect to the parenting of
children. The sharing of parental responsibilities during and after marriage
makes self-support by both spouses after divorce both possible and expected.286
Thus, social and legal trends push toward the goal of complete post-divorce
financial separation of the spouses.287
Today’s divorcing husband is often less susceptible to guilt while his exwife may be increasingly susceptible to guilt. First, the husband is less likely to
feel that he has caused the divorce and needs to purchase his freedom; the
concept of no-fault divorce embraces the belief that when a marriage breaks
down, both spouses share the blame in all but the rarest of cases and it is now
considered acceptable to end an unhappy marriage.288
Second, the husband may feel angry that the wife expects any financial
support at all. Once the marriage is over, divorcing spouses may be less
appreciative of each other’s contributions and less likely to recall that the
283. Also, lawyers may also have self-interested reasons for settling. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 162–63 (1985). Weitzman’s data is, to be sure, twenty-five years old.
However, in light of the fact that alimony is now awarded in an even lower percentage of divorce cases
than was the case when Weitzman did her study, it is a reasonable conclusion that lawyers are still
counseling their clients against squandering money pursuing litigation. See Bryan, supra note 144, at
1234–38.
284. Catherine Groves Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting of
Alimony on the Spouses, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 282, 288 (1939). In her article, social worker Peele
discusses the relationship between guilt and alimony for some husbands. According to Peele, some
husbands used their alimony checks to assuage guilt over what had happened to their families in the
aftermath of divorce. “Thus paying alimony, doing all that the court requires, may enable a man to
feel that he has bought his freedom, when otherwise he would have had to feel that what was
happening to his former wife or his children was some concern of his.” Id.
285. See, e.g., Terry Arendell, The Social Self as Gendered: A Masculinist Discourse of Divorce, 15
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 151 (1992).
286. Bryan, supra note 144, at 1206–14.
287. Id. See also, Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 129.
288. In past times shame—in the form of social stigma—may have kept many couples from
divorcing. For decades, that sense of shame has eroded in favor of a less judgmental acceptance of a
divorcing individual’s pursuit of happiness outside of the marriage. Professor Robert W. Kelso noted
that by the 1930s, divorce was viewed with more tolerance and did not necessarily result in social
ostracism. Kelso, supra note 23, at 193.
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division of home and economic labor was most likely a joint decision.289 In
particular, primary breadwinners may view their spouses as having received a
free ride.290 In interviews of a sample of divorced fathers, sociologist Terry
Arendell found that many divorced men devalued family activities performed
either during or after the marriage by their ex-wives.291 Over a third of the
sample characterized themselves as doing all the income earning as well as
taking an equal or nearly equal share in any caretaking activities.292 One man
characterized his wife as doing “next to nothing,” while he saw himself as
having and doing all necessary work and family tasks.293 This devaluation of the
ex-wife’s contributions “help[ed] sustain the perception that, at least in
retrospect, her economic dependence during marriage had been unfair, as was
any continued exchange of resources after divorce.”294 Not only were the men
unwilling to pay alimony, they sometimes balked at child support, which they
regarded “as a continuation of support for the undeserving former spouse.”295
Far from feeling guilty about the divorce, the majority of the men in the study
felt angry at the infringement of their rights by their ex-wives whom they saw as
aided and abetted by the legal system.296
This research is consistent with studies finding that men tend to value their
economic worth in terms of their abilities (rather than what the system would
give them), and that men have a higher sense of entitlement to economic rewards
than do women.297 Indeed, since married men tend to have higher incomes than
married women, men “anchor” their expectations for divorce outcomes to this
marketplace information about their relative worth.298
Third, in a society where the majority of women work outside of the home
and their wages and opportunities are on the rise, many men will not feel guilty
for refusing to pay alimony and forcing their wives to support themselves.
Furthermore, a husband may believe that paying alimony to an ex-wife will
greatly impede his ability to remarry and support a new family, an outcome
viewed by society as both likely and desirable.299 Indeed, Professor Robert W.
Kelso notes that as early as the 1930s, society increasingly viewed alimony as
something that might be necessary to support a needy ex-wife (at least until her
remarriage) but that alimony should no longer “be used as an instrument with

289. See Kelly, supra note 199, at 124–25 (demonstrating that couples make these decisions
jointly).
290. Terry Arendell, The Social Self as Gendered: A Masculinist Discourse of Divorce, 15 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 151, 161 (1992).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 162.
296. Id.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 272–77.
298. Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 127–28.
299. See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L.
REV. 441, 523 n.196. Bryan cites “research indicating men’s tendency to abandon social responsibility
in favor of maximizing their own outcomes and women’s tendency to remain socially responsible to
those dependent on them.” Id.
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which to punish a guilty husband.”300 The husband’s potential guilt would be
further diminished if his wife initiated the divorce.301 In any event, with
women’s theoretically greater access to paid employment, support of a “needy
ex-wife” is temporary until she obtains employment, and such support is often
considered unnecessary if she already has employment.302
Fourth, today’s husband need not feel guilty about abandoning his children
simply because there has been a divorce. The almost automatic award of
custody to the mother is a thing of the past, and fathers can utilize every
opportunity to build significant relationships with their children through joint
physical custody that may equal or surpass the physical placement time awarded
to the mother.303 The large percentage of working mothers helps remove any
stigma that would come to the children of divorce from their mother’s
employment. Thus, there is theoretically no need to provide financial support
for the ex-wife in order to keep the children happy. Concerns about forcing a
reduced standard of living on any minor children can be addressed with joint
legal custody, shared physical placement, or child support payments.304
Thus, husbands can walk away from their divorces feeling like they are
continuing their duty as fathers but are entitled to a clean financial break from
wives who should be able to support themselves. They may feel some guilt over
the failed relationship, but they are less likely to feel guilty about financial
setbacks encountered by their ex-wives.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH
Current alimony policies are confusing, inconsistent, and in need of reform.
Other than maintaining the status quo, there are at least three realistic
possibilities for change: abolish alimony entirely, require couples entering
marriage to enter into prenuptial agreements that deal with the issue of alimony,
or impose formulas for alimony. Ultimately, the gender differences in emotional
reactions to divorce and the different bargaining behaviors that are thereby
generated mandate the adoption of alimony formulas in states that do not
already have them.
A. Abolish Alimony
Abolishing alimony would create certainty as to outcome in the event of a
300. Kelso, supra note 23, at 193.
301. Bryan, supra note 299, at 523 n.196. “[T]he inevitable pain and resultant hostility and
resentment that accompanies divorce should decrease the husband’s willingness to provide for his
ex-wife. The husband’s reluctance to share financial assets with his wife may be worse when she,
rather than he, initiates the divorce.” Id.
302. Bryan, supra note 144, at 1213. “Current law focuses on the wife’s need, resulting in
decisions in which wives who earn $12,000 to $20,000 a year are found to have no ‘need’ for alimony
irrespective of their husbands’ ability to pay.” Id.
303. HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 643–44 (stating that some states have a
preference for joint custody and most states permit it).
304. Of course, child support ends when the child reaches the age of majority, regardless of what
the mother’s own self-supported standard of living is at that time. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.511 (West
2011) (stating that child support payments continue until age eighteen or when the child graduates
from high school, whichever is later, provided that support ends in any event at age nineteen).
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divorce. In recent years, proponents in several states have supported this
approach and have proposed legislation to limit or prohibit alimony in certain
circumstances.305 For example, Texas limits alimony awards to couples that have
been married for more than ten years if one spouse cannot support herself.306
Similarly, Utah only allows alimony payments for a time period equal to the
years of the marriage.307 The Massachusetts legislature also recently passed
legislation to severely limit alimony.308 These states have effectively banned
alimony in all but specified circumstances.
An alimony ban might influence earning behavior during marriage.
Presumably, women would be more cautious about forgoing education or job
opportunities if they knew with certainty that they would be fully responsible for
their own support in the event that their marriages end in divorce. In a classic
article on the subject, Professor Herma Hill Kay expresses the opinion that law
and society should not “encourage future couples entering marriage to make
choices that will be economically disabling for women, thereby perpetuating
their traditional financial dependence upon men and contributing to their
inequality with men at divorce.”309 Although Kay acknowledges that there
might be good reasons for mothers to stay at home with their children, she
argues that true economic gender equality can only be achieved if family law
withdraws support for the social norm of a male breadwinner and a female stayat-home parent.310 This argument has particular appeal for theorists who see
marriage and divorce in terms of economic theory where decisions made in the
context of a family are viewed in terms of economic incentives and
disincentive.311 Economist Gary Becker pioneered this approach when he used
economic formulas for efficiency, utility, and other measures to analyze
marriage, division of labor between spouses, decisions about children, and
decisions over whether to marry or divorce.312 This purely economic approach,
however, does not account for the moral dimensions of family decision305. Korey C. Lundin, Committee Studies Spousal Maintenance Awards—Legislation Expected, 31 WIS.
J. FAM. L. 30, 30–31 (2011).
306. TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2) (2011). Alimony may also be granted in certain domestic violence
situations. Id.
307. UTAH CODE § 30-3-5 (8)(h) (2011).
308. Jack Flynn, Gov. Patrick OKs ‘Sweeping Overhaul’ of Massachusetts Alimony Laws, Sept. 26,
2011,
available
at
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/
gov_patrick_oks_sweeping_overh.html. See also, Cheryl Wetzstein, States No Longer Wedded to the Idea
of
Alimony
for
Life,
WASH.
TIMES,
July
28,
2011,
available
at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/states-no-longer-wedded-to-idea-ofalimony-for-lif/?page=2&width=100%25&iframe=true&height=100%25/.
309. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80 (1987).
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing
the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2008); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1989); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994).
312. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY, (Enlarged ed., 1991) (arguing, among other
things, that quantifying energy expended by women performing housework and childcare can be
used in economic formulas to explain women’s lesser investment in market capital and to largely
explain the earnings differential and gender specific job segregation of men and women).
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making.313 Similarly, the economic approach ignores gender differences in how
spouses regard children and the marital relationship. Women are more childoriented, and their caretaking of children is under-valued by society even though
that caretaking is absolutely crucial to the survival of society itself.314 This
argument is consistent with research discussing how women tend to be more
attuned to relationships, more willing to act to further or preserve relationships
(even when to do so leads to economic disadvantages), and more likely to feel
guilty when relationships go awry.315 If these patterns are accurate, women
might well make the same decisions about balancing participation in the
workforce with childcare, even if they know that alimony would not be available
to cushion the economic blow of a divorce. Indeed, there is some evidence that
this is the case: significant percentages of women with minor children have
continued to drop out or cut back from the paid work force during the same
period of time that alimony awards have become less frequent, as well as smaller
and for shorter durations where awarded at all.316
Another objection to the systemic abolition of alimony is that it increases the
power of the primary wage earner when couples bargain for divorce settlements.
If courts are precluded from awarding alimony even in cases of dire need or
egregiously exploitive behavior by one spouse, there is less incentive for
someone to agree to pay alimony through a settlement, even if in exchange for
some sought-after concession by the opposing party. After all, the more
powerful party might still convince a court to order the sought-after concession,
but the court would lack authority to order alimony.
Furthermore, such a ban would cause draconian results for divorcing
spouses who are genuinely without resources.317 Although courts no longer
favor alimony, it may be a necessary remedy in hardship cases, such as when one
spouse is disabled and unable to become self-supporting.
Finally, there may not be public support for a complete ban on alimony.
According to Ellman and Braver, a significant percentage of the population
favors alimony in at least some circumstances. 318
B. Require Notice or Explicit Pre-nuptial Agreement to a Particular Outcome
Requiring couples to enter prenuptial agreements regarding alimony is
another possibility. Such a solution would introduce predictability to the

313. Estin, supra note 251, at 527.
314. See generally Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495
(2001).
315. See supra Part III. A.i.–ii.
316. Garrison’s research shows a dramatic drop in alimony awards in New York between 1978
and 1984, a period of time during which there was a large increase in the number of married women
in the paid workforce. See supra text accompanying notes 39–45. However, 50 percent of such
women were not in the paid workforce at that time and might have been in need of alimony that they
did not receive. Id.
317. For example, a spouse who suffered from a debilitating illness might be unable to work, but
an outright alimony ban would not allow the court discretion to order alimony for her support even
if she had used her healthy years to care for her husband and children.
318. See Ellman & Braver, supra note 56. This preference for alimony was not related to whether
the person surveyed had ever been divorced. Id.
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question of whether a married woman could reasonably expect alimony in the
event her marriage ends in divorce. If couples were forced to confront the
question of alimony before marriage, they might realize that their economic
decisions could have far-reaching consequences at the point of divorce. If the
couple agrees that there will be no alimony, there is more incentive for both to
remain in the paid workforce. In any event, it would be hard to argue that, like
Terry Hekker,319 they were completely blindsided when no alimony was
awarded.
One of the main problems with this approach is that, at the time of
marriage, nobody ever seems to think he or she will ever get a divorce.320 Thus,
star-struck lovers may willingly agree to waive alimony only to have the waiver
come back to haunt them later when, for example, the wife has suffered
diminished job prospects from remaining home with children.
Additionally, the direction of modern divorce law precludes paternalistic
insistence on self-protective pre-marital behavior. Current trends demonstrate a
preference that divorcing spouses negotiate and reach private settlements
allocating their assets and allow them considerable latitude in doing so.321
Requiring a prenuptial agreement is more coercive than usual practice.
Lastly, prenuptial agreements are given only a presumption of validity in
many cases and may be set aside in hardship cases, such as when an ex-spouse is
unable to support herself after a divorce (although even in a true hardship case
the judge’s discretion makes the outcome uncertain).322 Prenuptial agreements
could thus be undermined by overly broad exercise of judicial discretion and
might be ineffective in bringing structure and predictability to alimony awards.
C. Impose Formulas for Uniformity
Mandatory formulas for alimony that are similar in form to the mandatory
formulas for child support are another proposed solution. Formulas can take
account of the length of the marriage, the income discrepancy between the
parties, the number of years one party spent as the primary childcare parent, and
any other relevant factors. Several jurisdictions, including some in Michigan,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, have adopted alimony guideline formulas for
at least some purposes.323 A review of such guidelines by the American
Academy of Matrimonial Law (AAML) prior to its 2002 issuance of principles to
be considered in the award of alimony found that all guidelines in use at that
time looked to the duration of the marriage and the income of the spouses.324
319. See Hekker, supra note 16.
320. See supra Part III.A.ii.
321. Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 255, at 115.
322. See, e.g., Wisconsin’s statute on marital property agreements. WIS. STAT. §766.58 (9) (a)
(2011). “Modification or elimination of spousal support during the marriage may not result in a
spouse having less than necessary and adequate support, taking into consideration all sources of
support.” Id. §766.58(9)(b) suggests that the court’s discretion to order alimony notwithstanding a
spousal agreement waiving it is limited to situations where the destitute spouse is eligible for public
assistance, but a broader interpretation of the court’s powers is also possible.
323. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony,
Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 61, 73–77 (2008).
324. Id. at 78.
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The AAML’s subsequent proposal offers one example of how an alimony
formula might work.325 Under that proposal, an amount of alimony to be used as
a starting point in negotiations would be calculated by subtracting 20 percent of
the payee’s gross income from 30 percent of the payer’s gross income, with the
limitation that the payee would not receive more than 40 percent of the
combined gross income of the parties.326 The model also provides for various
factors that would justify deviation, including when one spouse is a primary
caretaker of a dependent child (either a minor or adult), when one spouse has
received a disproportionate share of property in the divorce, or when one spouse
is under a court order to make support or debt payments to another party.327
Although these factors are important considerations, they might take the vast
majority of divorces out of the proposed starting formula because many divorce
decrees designate a primary custodial parent or award uneven property
distributions, and either of those circumstances would justify deviation from the
formula.328 Additionally, the Principles and Considerations do not specify which
divorcing spouses will be eligible for alimony but only provide a starting point
for calculation once eligibility is otherwise determined.329
Texas offers a more straightforward example of an alimony formula.330 In
Texas, there is a presumption against alimony, but the law allows alimony in two
types of cases: where there has been a conviction or deferred adjudication of
domestic violence or where, in a marriage lasting ten years or more, one spouse
is not capable of self-support.331 If at least one of these criteria is met, the
recipient spouse will receive the lesser of $2,500 per month or twenty percent of
the payer’s average monthly gross income.332 Maintenance payments terminate
after a maximum of three years, or upon the death, remarriage, or cohabitation of
the payee spouse, whichever occurs first.333 However, if the payee spouse has a
permanent physical or mental disability, maintenance may continue
indefinitely.334 In contrast with the AAML proposal, the Texas guidelines allow
payment of alimony in far fewer situations, but there are fewer exceptions or
factors allowing for deviation once the threshold requirements for receiving

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 78–79. Other reasons for deviation include one spouse having unusual needs, unusual
tax consequences, the ages of the spouses, and whether one spouse has given up a career, career
opportunities, or in some other way supported the career of the other spouse. Id.
328. Moreover, deviation might not be entirely justified in terms of providing a fair level of
support for a dependent spouse. For example, a lower-earning spouse may receive a slightly larger
share of the marital property than her husband, but it may not be enough to provide her with
ongoing support until she can achieve the marital standard of living. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
LaRoque, 406 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1987). Nonetheless, the unequal property award would constitute a
disproportionate share of the property, justifying removal of the case from application of the formula.
329. See Kisthardt, supra note 323, at 79.
330. TEX. FAM. CODE §8.051 (2011).
331. Id. Incapacity for self-support may be due to physical or mental incapacity, lack of earning
ability in the labor market, or the necessity of providing care and supervision for a disabled child. Id.
at §8.051(2).
332. Id. at §8.055.
333. Id. at §§ 8.054(1), 8.056.
334. Id. at § 8.054.
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alimony have been met.335 This is more desirable because it makes outcomes
more predictable, and women who are eligible for alimony are less likely to lose
out on it because they feel too guilty, ashamed, or intimidated to bargain for it.
Implementation of alimony formulas does have a potential downside: if
formulas are strictly adhered to, judges could lose discretion to carve out
solutions that will optimally protect the property and personal interests of each
unique individual seeking a divorce. A one-size-fits-all solution may not fit the
needs of each divorcing couple perfectly. However, the unequal and sometimes
unfair results stemming from vague statutes and poorly exercised judicial
discretion have fallen disproportionately on divorced women with children.336
Formulas have the advantage of providing a starting point, and if drafted with
limited possibilities of deviation, formulas can potentially allow dependent
spouses to count on a minimum level of support.
Formulas provide predictability while also allowing for flexibility in certain
circumstances. Like child support formulas, alimony formulas can be designed
as strongly presumptive but allow an opportunity for rebuttal of the
presumption in cases with unusual or compelling circumstances. With formulas,
spouses who are in predictably vulnerable economic circumstances, such as longterm homemakers or stay-at-home mothers with young children, would not be
forced to bargain aggressively in order to obtain at least temporary alimony if the
formulas presumed alimony under similar circumstances. Guilt, shame, or
gender-based hesitancy to make a good deal would play less of a role in the
ultimate outcome. Spousal maintenance formulas may indeed be an idea whose
time has come.
V. CONCLUSION
Social and individual expectations about marriage are highly charged with
emotion, and these expectations are in some ways contradictory. This article
demonstrates that while divorce can be painful and guilt-inducing for both
partners, women are especially vulnerable to feelings of guilt and shame and are
particularly likely to act in self-defeating ways in the course of settlement
negotiations. Women’s guilt in the divorce context can come from a variety of
sources, such as a greater emotional vulnerability when facing relationship
disruptions or guilt over initiating a divorce that may be desired by both
spouses.
In addition, idealized expectations surrounding motherhood,
exacerbated by a barrage of perfect-mother media images, contribute to the guilt
experienced by women whose families are split by divorce. These factors impact
whether women seek alimony at all, and they appear to negatively affect the
women’s ability to bargain effectively on their own behalf. It may be possible to
mitigate some of the dire economic impact of divorce on many women by
implementing state alimony formulas that guarantee alimony awards in cases of
financial hardship. Hopefully, however, a simple awareness of the patterns that
exacerbate unfairness in alimony outcomes will help the family court system
adjust in ways that allow fairer solutions for ex-spouses as they go on with the

335.
336.

Id. at §8.051.
See supra Part II.A.

McMullen_Paginated (Do Not Delete)

3/13/2012 10:14 AM

WOMEN, GUILT, AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE
rest of their lives.

81

